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2014 PATENT LAW DECISIONS
INTRODUCTION

In 2014, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal
Circuit) continued to wrestle with issues including standing,
deference, laches, fee shifting, inducement, indefiniteness, claim
construction, patentability, anticipation, and obviousness.
This
article highlights the key cases that the Federal Circuit considered in
2014 in those areas, many of which were also considered or may be
considered by the Supreme Court of the United States.
I.

CHANGES TO THE COURT

On May 30, 2014, ChiefJudge Rader stepped down as Chief Judge
of the Federal Circuit.' CircuitJudge Prost assumed the vacated position
2
on May 31, 2014 as the seventh Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit.
Judge Rader retired from the Federal Circuit on June 30, 2014.'
In addition to Judge Rader's retirement, 2014 brought voices of
three new judges sworn onto the bench in 2013 (Richard G.
Taranto, 4 Raymond T. Chen, 5 and Todd M. Hughes6 ). On November
12, 2014, President Barack Obama also announced the nomination of
Kara Farnandez Stoll to the bench.7

1. ChiefJudge Randall R. Rader to Step Down as ChiefJudge on May 30, 2014, U.S.
CT. APPEALS FOR FED. CIR., http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/2014/chief-judge-randall-rrader-to-step-down-as-chief-judge-on-may-30-2014.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2015).
2. CircuitJudge Sharon Prost Assumed the Position of ChiefJudge of the Federal Circuit
on May 31, 2014, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FED. CIR., http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/
announcements/circuit-judge-sharn-prst-assumed-the-psitin-f-chief-judge-ofthe-federal-circuit-on-may-31-2014.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2015).
3. CircuitJudge Rader to Retire, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FED. CIR., http://www.cafc.
uscourts.gov/2014/circuit-judge-rader-to-retire.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2015).
4. Richard G. Taranto Sworn in as Federal CircuitJudge on Friday, March 15, 2013,
U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FED. CIR., http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/2013/richard-g-tarantosworn-in-as-federal-circuit-judge-on-friday-march-15-2013.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2015).
5. Raymond 7'. Chen Sworn in as Federal Circuit judge on Monday on August 5,
2013, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FED. CIR., http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/2013/raymondt-chen-sworn-in-as-federal-circuitudge-on-monday-on-august-5-2013.html
(last visited
Apr. 21, 2015).
6. Todd M. Hughes Sworn in as Federal CircuitJudge on Monday September 30, 2013,
U.S. Cr. APPEALS FOR FED. CIR., http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/2013/todd-m-hughes-swornin-as-federal-circuitjudge-on-monday-september-30-2013.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2015).
7. Press Release, White House, President Obama Nominates Two to Serve on
the United States Courts of Appeals (Nov. 12, 2014), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/12/president-obamanominates-two-serve-united-states-courts-appeals.
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ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE

On November 5, 2014, the Federal Circuit published an unusual
order regarding the discipline of an attorney. The eleven active
judges of the Federal Circuit reprimanded Mr. Edward Reines for
attempting to solicit clients with a laudatory email that he received
from then-Chief Judge Rader.8 Although the Federal Circuit did not
sanction Mr. Reines beyond the public reprimand, Mr. Reines may
still face actions by the California Bar.9
III. PROCEDURAL ISSUES

A. Standing
To meet the constitutional minimum for standing, the party
seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction must satisfy three
requirements.1 0 First, the party must show that it suffered an "injury
in fact," which the court defined as "an invasion of a legally protected
interest which is (a) concrete and particularized; and (b) actual or
imminent" (as opposed to "conjectural or hypothetical").11 Second,
it must show that the injury is "fairly... trace [able] to the challenged
action."12 Third, the party must show that it is "'likely,' as opposed to
merely 'speculative,' that the injury will be 'redressed by a favorable
decision."13 This year, the Federal Circuit showed a heightened
interest in Article III standing requirements with its decisions in
Consumer Watchdog v. Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation,4 MadStad
EngineeringInc. v. USPTO,1" and Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc. 6
Consumer Watchdog is a non-profit charity "dedicated to providing
a voice for taxpayers and consumers in special interest-dominated
public discourse, government and politics," which filed for an inter
partes reexamination of U.S. Patent No. 7,029,913 ("'913 patent")
owned by Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation ("WARF") in
2006.17 While Consumer Watchdog had the right to request the
8. In reReines, 771 F.3d 1326, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (per curiam).
9. Id. at 1334.
10. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).

11. Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
12. Id. at 560-61 (alterations in original) (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights
Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976)).
13. Id. at 561 (quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 38, 43).
14. 753 F.3d 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1401 (2015).
15. 756 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1398 (2015).
16. 773 F.3d 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
17. Consumer Watchdog, 753 F.3d at 1260.
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reexamination at the United States Patent and Trademark Office
("USPTO"), which granted the request, it did not have standing to
appeal to the Federal Circuit after the USPTO affirmed the four
claims at issue.'" Under 35 U.S.C. §§ 311(a) and 314(b) (2), a third
party can request reexamination and participate in the proceedings.' 9
However, "[f]ederal courts do not have authority to entertain every
dispute.

2

°

The

courts

are

limited

to

actual

"Cases"

and

21
"Controversies" under Article III of the U.S. Constitution.
Consumer Watchdog failed to show that it had suffered an injury in
fact.2 2 It did not allege "any involvement in research or commercial
activities involving human embryonic stem cells." 23 It did not allege
that "it is an actual or prospective competitor of WARF or licensee of
the '913 patent."24 Rather, it merely stated "it was concerned that
the '913 patent allowed WARF to completely preempt all uses of
human embryonic stem cells, particularly those for scientific and
medical research. "25
The Federal Circuit held that Consumer Watchdog lacked standing
to appeal the Board's decision because it failed to identify "a
particularized, concrete interest in the patentability of the '913
patent, or any injury in fact flowing from the Board's decision."26
The court reiterated the Article III standing requirements under
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife27 : an injury-in-fact that is (1) "concrete
and particularized, and actual or imminent"; (2) "fairly traceable to
the challenged action"; and (3) likely to be redressed by a favorable
judicial decision.28
On October 31, 2014, Consumer Watchdog filed a petition to the
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, challenging the Federal
Circuit's dismissal and presenting the following question: "Does a
statute that expressly provides a requester of agency action a right to
appeal any dissatisfactory decision of the agency on her request to the

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 1262-63.
Id. at 1262 (citing 35 U.S.C. §§ 311 (a), 314(b) (2) (2006)).
Id. at 1260.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
Consumer Watchdog, 753 F.3d at 1263.
Id. at 1260.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1263.
504 U.S. 555 (1992).
Consumer Watchdog, 753 F.3d at 1260-61.
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courts provide sufficient Article III standing for the appeal, or must
additional requirements be satisfied above and beyond the statute?"29
Consumer Watchdog cites Lujan in support of its Petition, 3 but its
position was also in conformity with other cases not considered by the
Federal Circuit, such as NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co.3' and Public
32
Citizen v. DOJ.
Petitioner argues that normal standing rules do not
apply for a statutory action which provides a right of appellate review
of an agency decision.3
However, the Supreme Court denied
certiorari on February 23, 2015."4
The Federal Circuit reviewed the Lujan standing requirements
again in MadStad 5 In MadStad, the appellant, an engineering firm
that has filed and received U.S. patents, claimed that the "firstinventor-to-file" provision of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act
(AIA) is unconstitutional.36 MadStad argued that it had been forced
to increase computer security and divert its business resources to
prepare more patent applications and file at a faster rate; was at a
competitive disadvantage against larger companies; and had lost
business and investment opportunities due to the AIA provision.
Indeed, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of two
government regulations in 2013. In Clapper v. Amnesty International
USA, 8 the Supreme Court held that Amnesty International USA
("Amnesty") did not have standing to assert a constitutional
challenge to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) because
its argument rested on speculative and subjective fear.39 The district
court in MadStad cited the Clapper decision when dismissing
MadStad's requests for a declaratory judgment that the "first-

29. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Consumer Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni
Research Found., 135 S. Ct. 1401 (2015) (No. 14-516), 2014 WL 5659398.
30. Id. at 7-8 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560).
31. 437 U.S. 214, 216, 221 (1978) (holding that absent a statutory exemption,
requests under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requires that agencies
disclose records and materials).
32. 491 U.S. 440, 449 (1989) (refusal to permit scrutinizing of "the ABA
Committee's activities to the extent FACA allows constitutes a sufficiently distinct
injury to provide standing to sue").
33. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 29, at 8-9.
34. Consumer Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 135 S. Ct. 1401,1401 (2015).
35. Madstad Eng'g, Inc. v. USPTO, 756 F.3d 1366, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014), cert.
denied, 135 S.Ct. 1398 (2015).
36. Id. at 1368.
37. Id. at 1372, 1375.
38. 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
39. Id. at 1148 (refusing to grant standing that rested on speculation about
possible future harms).
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inventor-to-file" provision is unconstitutional and a permanent
injunction barring enforcement of the AIA.4" Reviewing standing de
novo, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal for
lack of standing and found that MadStad lacked a concrete and
particularized injury, thereby, failing the first Lujan prong.4
Although MadStad argued that it suffered threats of harm less
speculative than those in Clapper and faced "a sufficient 'substantial
risk' of suffering the injuries,"42 the Federal Circuit found that each
43
of MadStad's arguments failed and held that MadStad lacked standing.
A different standing issue considered by the Federal Circuit in
2014 (later denied on en banc review) is whether a party can
maintain standing where there is a non-party, co-owner of a patent
who had not voluntarily joined as a co-plaintiff and could not be
involuntarily joined.44
STC.UNM ("STC") sued Intel Corporation for infringement of
U.S. Patent No. 6,042,998 ("'998 patent"). 45 The district court
dismissed the case because, "as a matter of substantive patent law, all
co-owners must ordinarily consent to join as plaintiffs in an
infringement suit," but Sandia, co-owner of the patent, had not
joined voluntarily and could not be joined involuntarily under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19.46
There were four inventors of U.S. Patent No. 5,705,321 ("'321
patent")

.47

While three inventors were employed by the University of

New Mexico ("UNM"), the fourth was employed by Sandia.4 8 An
assignment erroneously defined all four inventors as employees of
UNM and named UNM as the assignee of the '321 patent.4 9 When
UNM later executed an assignment to Sandia to correct the error, the
assignment explicitly transferred to Sandia "those rights and interests
previously assigned to [UNM] by Bruce Draper... and to any and all
40. MadStad Eng'g, Inc. v. USPTO, No. 8:12-cv-1589, 2013 WL 3155280, at *4-7
(M.D. Fla. May 8, 2013), aff'd, 756 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S.
Ct. 1398 (2015).
41. MadStad, 756 F.3d at 1371,1379-81.
42. Id.at 1373.
43. Id.at 1381.
44. STC.UNM v. Intel Corp., 754 F.3d 940, 941 (Fed. Cir. 2014), reh'g en banc
denied, 767 F.3d 1351, and cert. denied, 83 U.S.L.W. 3562 (2015).
45. Id.
46. Id. (quoting Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1468
(Fed. Cir. 1998)).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 942.
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Patents which may be issued thereon ...and to any and all divisions,
reissues, continuations, and extensions.""° Two of the inventors filed
an application that led to the '998 patent.5 1 The application
referenced the '321 patent without claiming priority.5 2 During
prosecution of the '998 patent, the USPTO "twice rejected its claims
for double patenting over the '321 patent, which shared two common
inventors." 3 UNM filed a terminal disclaimer to overcome the
double patenting rejections, stating that "any patent granted on this
instant application shall be enforceable only for and during such
period that the '998 and '321 patents are commonly owned."54 UNM
also stated that it was the owner of record and had a 100% interest in
the application.5
UNM later assigned its interest in the patents to STC-"a whollyowned licensing arm of UNM."" STC subsequently added two
other UNM employees as inventors of the '998 patent and also had
the USPTO correct that the '998 was a continuation-in-part of the
'321 patent. 7
When STC sued Intel for patent infringement, Sandia did not
join. The district court granted Intel's motion to dismiss for lack of
standing because "a co-owner seeking to enforce the patent mustjoin
all other co-owners as plaintiffs to establish standing."59 "Without this
joinder, the plaintiff cannot pursue an infringement suit. "60 In
Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp.,61 the court examined two limited
circumstances where a co-owner can be involuntarily joined, 62 but
6
those circumstances were not applicable in STC. UNM. 1

STC appealed "whether Sandia can be involuntarily joined under
Rule 19(a) as well as the district court's partial grant of summary
judgment on the timing of Sandia's co-ownership." 6 Citing its
50. Id. (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
54. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 942-43.
59. Id. at 943-44.
60. Id. at 944 (citing Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1468
(Fed. Cir. 1998)).
61, 135 F.3d 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
62. Id. at 1468 & n.9; id.
at 1469-72 (Newman,J., dissenting).
63. STC. UNM, 754 F.3d at 944.
64. Id.
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holding in Ethicon that substantive patent law ordinarily requires coowners to consent to suit, the Federal Circuit held that STC lacked
standing because Sandia had not voluntarily joined the suit and that
no exception was valid, the general substantive rule applied.65 The
exceptions include (1) "when any patent owner has granted an
exclusive license, he stands in a relationship of trust to his licensee
and can be involuntarily joined as a plaintiff," and (2) "[i]f, by
agreement, a co-owner waives his right to refuse to join suit, his coowners may subsequently force him to join in a suit against
infringers."66 The full Federal Circuit voted 6-4 not to conduct an en
banc review of the decision.67 The concurring judges contended that
the substantive patent law affirmatively requires consent among all
co-owners of a patent before suit can be brought and that Rule 19 did
not obligate a co-owner to join.'
It is substantive patent law, not Rule 19, that answers the dispositive
question here: whether one co-owner may unilaterally enforce a
patent, without the consent of other co-owners.
As to that underlying substantive-rights question, precedent has
long provided a clear answer. This court has consistently
recognized that the substantive right to enforce the patent does not
belong unilaterally to each co-owner, but requires all of the coowners' agreement, so that each co-owner has a substantive right
not to be involuntarily
joined in a patent infringement suit without
69
such agreement.
In contrast, the dissenting judges argued that according to Rule
19(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, when one necessary
party has not joined a suit, courts "must order" that party to join
involuntarily." Judge Pauline Newman wrote that the court's holding
that Rule 19 "uniquely does not apply in patent cases" removed
patent litigation "from the mainstream of the law."7 Essentially, she
claimed that parties like STC are being improperly denied access to
the courts for resolving its dispute. Such disparity among the Federal
Circuit judges may make this issue ripe for Supreme Court review.
The petition for certiorari was filed on December 16, 2014.

65. Id. at 946.
66. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1468 n.9) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
67. STC.UNM v. Intel Corp., 767 F.3d 1351, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (per curiam).
68. Id. at 1352-53 (Dyk,J., concurring) (quoting FED. R. CIv. P. 19(a) (1)).
69. Id. at 1353.
70. Id. at 1355 (Newman,J, dissenting).
71. Id.
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In Azure Networks, LLC v. CSR PLC,72 the Federal Circuit's
examination of standing focused on the importance of effective
patent assignment. 7
Azure Networks ("Azure") and Tri-County
Excelsior Foundation ("Tri-County") together sued CSR PLC and
seven other defendants for patent infringement of U.S. Patent No.
7,756,129 ("the '129 patent"). 74
However, "[t]he district court
granted the Appellees' motion to dismiss Tri-County for lack of
standing, finding that Tri-County had effectively assigned Azure the
75
['] 129 patent.
Azure, which owned the '129 patent, donated it to Tri-County. 76 A
few weeks later, Azure and Tri-County entered into an "Exclusive
Patent License Agreement" which transferred numerous rights in the
'129 patent back to Azure. 77 Specifically, the agreement "granted
Azure the exclusive, worldwide, transferable right to (i) make, have
made, use, sell, offer to sell, import, and lease any products, (ii) use
and perform any method, process, and/or services, and (iii)
otherwise practice any invention in any manner under the [']129
patent. '78 It also granted Azure the "full right to enforce or and/or
sublicense" the '129 patent, "including the authority to reach
settlements without Tri-County's consent." 79 Moreover, Azure could
assign the entire agreement or any of its rights under the agreement
without Tri-County's consent, including "the exclusive right.., to
control future prosecution or pay maintenance fees related to the
['] 129 patent family."8"
The Federal Circuit held that Tri-County had no rights to sue as coplaintiff because the Agreement conferred those rights to Azure
alone. 8' The Federal Circuit looked to the parties' intent,82 as well as
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
patent

771 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2014), vacated, 83 U.S.L.W. 3683 (2015).
Id. at 1339.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1341.
Id.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at 1342 ("[W]hichever party has all, or substantially all, rights in the
'alone has standing to sue for infringement."' (quoting Morrow v. Microsoft

Corp., 499 F.3d 1332, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2007))).

82. Id. ("To determine whether an exclusive license is tantamount to an
assignment, we must ascertain the intention of the parties [to the license agreement]
and examine the substance of what was granted." (alteration in original) (quoting
Alfred E. Mann Found. for Scientific Research v. Cochlear Corp., 604 F.3d 1354,
1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2015]
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a non-exhaustive list of rights to determine whether a licensor has
transferred all substantial rights to the licensee." After weighing all
the factors, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's
determination that Tri-County had transferred all substantial rights in
the '129 patent to Azure, "making Azure the effective owner for
purposes of standing." 4
The Federal Circuit addressed standing again in Sandoz Inc., which
is a declaratory judgment action.
Amgen's rheumatoid arthritis
86
product named Enbrel® contains the active ingredient etanercept.
Etanercept is covered by two patents exclusively licensed to Amgen by
Hoffman-La Roche (U.S. Patent Nos. 8,063,182 and 8,163,522).7
Sandoz began developing its own etanercept drug and needed FDA
approval to enter the market. 8 In 2010, however, Congress enacted
the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009
("BPCIA") ,89 which established "an FDA regulatory-approval
process... for biological products that are shown to be 'biosimilar'
to a 'reference product' already approved by the FDA."9"
While Amgen met with the FDA to plan for an application based
on biosimilarity to Enbrel®, it did not file the application for FDA
approval or followed the procedures established by the BPCIA before
filing a complaint against Amgen and Hoffman-LaRoche for
declaratory judgment.'
The district court dismissed the case,

determining that there was no Article III controversy between the

83. Id. at 1343 (citing Alfred E. Mann Found., 604 F.3d at 1360-61) ("(1) the
nature and scope of the right to bring suit; (2) the exclusive right to make, use, and
sell products or services under the patent; (3) the scope of the licensee's right to
sublicense; (4) the reversionary rights to the licensor following termination or
expiration of the license; (5) the right of the licensor to receive a portion of the
proceeds from litigating or licensing the patent; (6) the duration of the license
rights; (7) the ability of the licensor to supervise and control the licensee's activities;
(8) the obligation of the licensor to continue paying maintenance fees; and (9) any
limits on the licensee's right to assign its interests in the patent.").
84. Id. at 1347.
85. Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 773 F.3d 1274, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
86. Id. at 1275-76.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1276.
89. 42 U.S.C. § 262 (2012).
90. Sandoz Inc., 773 F.3d at 1276 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)).
91. Id. at 1276 (explaining that Sandoz sought a declaratory judgment that "the
manufacture, use, sale, offering for sale, or importation of its etanercept product will
not infringe, directly or indirectly, any valid claim of either the ['] 182 or the [']522
patent, that both patents are unenforceable due to prosecution laches, and that both
patents are invalid" (internal quotation marks omitted)).

746

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:735

parties and that the BPCIA barred the suit." The Federal Circuit
reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the dismissal; however, it did
not address the district court's interpretation of the BPCIA.9"
Under the Declaratory Judgment Act, "[i]n a case of actual
controversy within its jurisdiction.... any court of the United
States... may declare the rights and other legal relations of any
interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further
relief is or could be sought."9 4 The "'case of actual controversy'
[phrase] in the Act refers to the type of 'Cases' and 'Controversies'
that are justiciable under Article III."" Thus, the Federal Circuit
concluded that Sandoz's complaint, as in Consumer Watchdog, did not
present a case or controversy necessary under Article III.96
B.

DeferenceDue to District Courts

Fifteen years ago, the Federal Circuit resolved an ambiguity
plaguing its jurisprudence after the Supreme Court's decision in
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,97 by definitively holding that the
standard of review of district court decisions concerning claim
construction is de novo.9 8 Since Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc.99
was decided, the de novo standard has been applied in a myriad of
100
decisions by the Federal Circuit, but not without some friction.
This tension finally came to a tipping point in 2014 when the Federal
Circuit decided Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. PhilipsElectronics North
America Corp.' (Lighting Ballast III), and Teva Pharmaceuticals USA,
Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.1

2

92. Id. at 1275.
93. Id. at 1277, 1282.
94. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a).
95. Sandoz, Inc., 773 F.3d at 1277 (quoting MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.,
549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007)).
96. Id. at 1278.
97. 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
98. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454-56 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
99. 138 F.3d 1448 (1998).
100. See Trading Techs. Int'l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., 595 F.3d 1340, 1350-51 (Fed.
Cir. 2010) ("Despite the Supreme Court's emphasis on the trial court's central role
for claim construction, including the evaluation of expert testimony, this court may
not give... the slightest iota of deference."); Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion
Roussel, Inc., 469 F.3d 1039, 1040 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Michel, J., dissenting) (arguing
that an en banc rehearing "would have enabled us to reconsider Cybor's rule of de
novo review for claim construction").
101. 744 F.3d 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2014), vacated, 135 S.Ct. 1173 (2015).
102. 723 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2013), vacated, 135 S.Ct. 831 (2015). The Supreme
Court has since issued its decision in Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 135 S.Ct.
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The Federal Circuit addressed appellate review in the Lighting
Ballast line of cases. In Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Electronics
North America Corp.'
(Lighting Ballast 1), the defendant Universal
Lighting Technologies (ULT) moved for summary judgment in the
district court, arguing in part that "voltage source means" is a "meansplus-function limitation" that would require a corresponding
structure in the specification pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) and
§ 112(b)." 4
The district court initially accepted the ULT's
15
construction but reversed it upon a motion for reconsideration.
The district court found that the means-plus-function limitation did
not apply and construed the claim according to its "ordinary meaning
in the art" to correspond to a "class of structures: a rectifier for
common applications in which the claimed device is used with an AC
power line; and a battery or the like for less commonly used
applications in which a DC power line is used."'0 6
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court's
ultimate finding de novo and originally reversed, holding that
"voltage source means" does indeed invoke means-plus-function
limitation and require a corresponding structure under § 112(f) and
§ 112(b).0 7 Failing to find such a structure, the original panel held
the claims "invalid for indefiniteness.""'8
Lighting Ballast then
requested a rehearing, "stating that on deferential appellate review
the district court would not or should not have been reversed."0 9 In
its rehearing, the Federal Circuit considered three questions:

831 (2015), raising the standard of review for factual findings underlying claim
construction rulings to "clear error." Granting greater deference to district court
factual findings could have a significant impact upon patent litigation by
heightening the importance of expert testimony. For the perspectives of various
patent law practitioners and scholars on the potential repercussions of this
discussion see Dennis Crouch, Giving Deference to the Supreme Court in Teva v. Sandoz,
PATENTLY-O (Jan. 21, 2015), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/01/deferencesupreme-sandoz.html.
103. No. 7:09-CV-29-O, 2010 WL 4946343 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 2, 2010), revd, 498 F.
App'x 986 (Fed. Cir. 2013), rev'd en banc, 744 F.3d 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2014), vacated, 135
S. Ct. 1173 (2015).
104. Id. at *9-13.
105. Lighting Ballast Control L.L.C. v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp. (Lighting Ballast
II), 498 F. App'x 986, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2013), revd en banc, 744 F.3d 1272 (Fed. Cir.
2014), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 1173 (2015).
106. Id.
107. Lighting Ballast Control L.L.C. v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp. (Lighting Ballast
II1),
744 F.3d 1272, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2014), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 1173 (2015).
108. Id.
109. Id.
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(1) Should this court overrule Cybor [Corp.]?
(2) Should this court afford deference to any aspect of a district
court's claim construction?

(3) If so, which aspects should be afforded deference?"' °
In addition to the parties' arguments, the court received
supplemental briefing and participation from thirty-eight amici
curiae, including companies such as Google and Microsoft, bar
associations such as the American Bar Association and the American
Intellectual Property Law Association, and other authorities such as
former Chief Judge Paul R. Michel and the United States. 1 1' The
Federal Circuit divided these entities into three groups: the first
believing that Cybor Corp. is "incorrect and should be entirely
discarded," the second favoring a "fusion or hybrid of de novo review
and deferential review," and the third arguing against changing the
Cybor Corp. standard."'
The first group, which supported the reversal of the Cybor Corp.
standard and consisting solely of Lighting Ballast, reasoned that the
Federal Circuit misinterpreted the Supreme Court's guidance in
Markman which had been limited to determining whether questions
of patent claim construction should be decided by a judge or a jury
but "did not address the standard of appellate review.""' Therefore,
the first group argued that, taking into account Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 52(a) (6),"" appellate deference should be afforded to
findings of fact made at the trial level."15 Through this approach, the
first group opined that restoring deference in the appellate review of
claim construction would "respect the traditional trial/appellate
relationship" and likely increase the weight given in the review
process to the credibility of witnesses.116
The second group, which favored a fusion or hybrid of de novo
and deferential review, consisted primarily of bar associations,
academic institutions, scholars, and the United States." 7 The group
110. Jd.at 1277.
111. Id.at1277n.2.
112. Id. at 1277-79.
113. Id. at 1277-78.
114. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6) ("Findings of fact, whether based on oral or other
evidence, must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court
must give due regard to the trial court's opportunity to judge the witnesses' credibility.").
115. LightingBallast 111, 744 F.3d at 1278.
116. Id.
117. Id.; Rodger Sadler, A Look at the Arguments in Lighting Ballast Rehearing,
LAW360 (Aug. 30, 2013, 12:01 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/468444/a-lookat-the-arguments-in-lighting-ballast-rehearing.
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recognized that the interpretation of patent claims is a "purely legal"
matter but divorced the completely factual aspects from de novo
review, arguing instead that those issues should be reviewed under
the clearly erroneous standard, "while the final conclusion receives
'
review as a matter of law."118
Anticipating the Federal Circuit's
wariness of the practicability of such a hybrid standard, this group
advocated "a solution whereby the standard of review would depend
on whether the district court's claim construction drew solely from
the record of the patent and its prosecution history (called 'intrinsic
evidence'), or whether external information or witness testimony was
presented in the district court (that is, 'extrinsic evidence')." Claim
constructions grounded in an analysis of the intrinsic evidence would
thus continue to receive de novo review, and those based on extrinsic
evidence would be reviewed for clear error.119 This second group also
argued that its hybrid approach would respect the traditional roles of
the trial and appellate courts and that it was consistent with the
"review of the determination of obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103. " ' 20
The final group, which argued against deviating from the Cybor
Corp. standard, was composed mostly of corporations. 12 ' The group
reasoned that the de novo standard was both "reasonable and
correct" in view of Markman as the Supreme Court had explicitly
stated "that claim construction [was] a 'purely legal' matter and that
'the interpretation of a so-called patent claim ... is a matter of
law.' 1'

22

Given the lack of motivation to change fifteen years of
jurisprudence, this third group advocated continuing to review claim
123
construction decisions de novo.
Faced with these three disparate viewpoints, the Federal Circuit
looked to various sources, such as the reasoning of Markman and its
citations; the practical effects of imposing "a new and uncertain
contentious inquiry into which aspects of a particular construction
fall on which side of the fact-law line;" and the principle of stare
decisis.124 It is this final idea "that courts will stand by things decided"
that swayed the judges to side with the third group's viewpoint and to

118. Lighting Ballast I, 744 F.3d at 1278 (quoting Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 391 (1996)).
119. Id. at 1278-79.
120. Id. at 1279.
121. Id. at 1279, 1287 n.4; Sadler, supra note 117.
122. Lighting Ballast IIl, 744 F.3d at 1279 (second alteration in original) (quoting
Markman, 517 U.S. at 372, 391).
123. Id. at 1279.
124. Id. at 1279-86.
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continue de novo review of district court decisions concerning claim
construction. 125 The theoretical underpinnings of stare decisis are
the "enhance[ment] [of] predictability and efficiency in dispute
resolution and legal proceedings, by enabling and fostering reliance
on prior rulings." 2 6 The court emphasized that the stability provided
by "stare decisis is the foundation of a nation governed by law." 127 With
these principles in mind, the Federal Circuit looked back through its
own history to its formation. 128 The Federal Circuit was created to
have exclusive jurisdiction over the appeals of district court decisions
relating to patent law in order to promote consistency and stability in
the area of practice.' 29 Recognizing these goals to be the same as
those underlying stare decisis, the court held that the Cybor Corp.
standard should not be changed. 30 The Federal Circuit recognized
that the nature of patent litigation today, which often involves
multiple cases and multiple forums, especially lends itself to a
hierarchal system where "this court [will] be able to resolve claim
construction definitely as a matter of precedent, rather than allow
differing trial court constructions of the same patent, as may result
Rather than "restore
from deferential review of close questions."''
the forum shopping that the Federal Circuit was created to avoid,"
the court opted to maintain the status quo. "2
The court also noted that, beyond the merits of stare decisis,
among all of the arguments presented by critics of Cybor Corp., there
was a marked dearth of genuine motivation to change the standard.'3 3
For instance, the court did not find any evidence that the de novo
standard was unworkable, especially after fifteen years of its
application.'
Neither did it find any showing of an increase in "the
burdens on the courts or litigants conducting claim construction."'31
Moreover, the court identified that the critics' arguments for
changing the standard were based on "concerns for judicial roles and
relationships" rather than the actual incorrectness of the de novo
125. Id. at 1281 (internal quotation marks omitted).
126. Id. (citing CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 131 S. Ct. 2630, 2641 (2011)).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1282-83.
129. Id. at 1282; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2012) (giving the Federal Circuit with
exclusive jurisdiction over patent law).
130. Lighting Ballast II, 744 F.3d at 1282-83.
131. Id. at 1280, 1286.
132. Id. at 1286.
133. Id. at 1283-84.
134. Id. at 1283.
135. Id.
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standard.'3 6 The court further noted the lack of congressional
intervention, "despite extensive patent-related legislative activity
during the entire period of Cybor [Corp.]'s existence."" 7 Finally, the
court could not find evidence that changing the Cybor Corp. standard
would affect the outcome of many cases, despite soliciting the amici
curiae for such proof.'38
With respect to the argument that claim construction decisions
often hinge on findings of fact, the court clarified:
Claim construction is a legal statement of the scope of the patent
right; it does not turn on witness credibility, but on the content of
the patent documents. The court may indeed benefit from
explanation of the technology and the instruction of treatises, but
the elaboration of experts or tutorial explanation of technical
subject matter does not convert patent claim construction into a
question of fact. The type of evidence that may assist a lay judge in
determining what a technical term meant to one of skill in the art
does not transform that meaning from a question of law into a
question of fact. Reference to technical understanding and usage
at the time of enactment does not convert statutory interpretation
from law to fact. 39
Therefore, the Federal Circuit decided 6-4 not to depart from the
Cybor Corp. de novo standard of review of district court decisions
regarding claim construction. 4 ° The court (1) determined that the
consistency and stability underlying stare decisis harmonized with the
rationale behind the creation of the Federal Circuit; (2) failed to find
any cogent points in favor of changing the Cybor Corp. standard, and
(3) affirmed that claim construction is a question of law that is not
converted into a question of fact merely because of the consideration
of some specific types of evidence.' 4'
In his concurrence, Judge Lourie added several points to the
majority's analysis.142 He stated that affording deference to a district
court's factual findings would be "an attempt to partially retreat"
from the Supreme Court's instruction in Markman to put claim

136. Id. at 1281.
137. Id. at 1283.

138. Id. at 1285 ("In response to a question at the hearing, amicus curiae United
States could not identify any case that would have come out differently under the
modified (hybrid) standard of review it proposed.").

139. Id. at 1284.
140. Id. at 1276 & n.*, 1286 (Judges Chen and Hughes did not take part in the

consideration or decision of the case).
141. Id.
142.

Id. at 1292-95 (Lourie,J., concurring).
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construction in the hands of the court rather than the jury.143 He
also distinguished the types of factual issues that are normally
decided by a district court judge from historical fact-finding (which
would be treated deferentially)'44 Finally, Judge Lourie reasoned
that while the law might state that "no deference" is given in the
appellate review, in practice, the Federal Circuit "notes and considers
how the district court construed the claims," and even when
1' 45
disagreeing, "it is not without a degree of informal deference.'
In the dissent penned by Judge O'Malley, in which former Chief
Judge Rader and Judges Reyna and Wallach joined, the judges
expressed that the legal community would be "surprised" by the
majority's opinion and that the doctrine of stare decisis did not
mandate that the court ignore its conviction that Cybor Corp. was
wrongly decided. 146
The dissent reiterated several instances in
Markman where the Supreme Court "acknowledged the factual
component of claim construction."' 47
It also pointed to several
''undesired consequences" that would flow from the majority's
decision.148 The dissent noted the disservice to stare decisis because
of the lack of stability and predictability in district court decisions;
the difficulty the appellate court would face when reviewing cases
with an "expurgated record"; the heightened impetus for appeal
and corresponding discouragement of settlement;
and the
ineffectiveness of transposing the construction of a claim term in
one patent case in another.'49
No doubt motivated at least in part by the chasm that divided the
majority and the dissent, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
review the decision in Teva Pharmaceuticals one month after the
Federal Circuit's decision in Lighting Ballast III. 15
In Teva
Pharmaceuticals, the patents-in-suit covered a product called
copolymer-1, which consists of four different amino acids in a certain

143. Id. at 1292.
144. Id. at 1293.
145. Id. at 1294.
146. Id. at 1296 (O'Malley,J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 1296-97 (suggesting that district courts should receive some deference
on factual determinations and credibility claims).
148. Id. at 1309-15.
149. Id.
150. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 723 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2013),
vacated, 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015). The Supreme Court granted certiorari on March 31,
2014, Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz Inc.. 134 S. Ct. 1761 (2014), and Lighting
BallastIII was decided on February 21, 2014. LightingBallastIII, 744 F.3d 1272.

2015]

2014 PATENT LAW DECISIONS

ratio, and methods for making the same. 5' Because "[a] sample of
polymeric material like copolymer-1 typically consists of a mixture of
individual polymer molecules that have varying molecular weights,"
one way to accurately describe the material is by specifying the
distribution of molecular weight.'52 There are several different ways
to describe distributions of molecular weight, including statistical
measures such as the peak average molecular weight (Mp), number
average molecular weight (Mn), and weight average molecular weight
(Mw).'
One could alternatively describe "how many molecules in a
polymer sample have molecular weights that fall within an arbitrarily
set range."'154 In the claim language of the patents-in-suit, one set of
claims described the molecular weight of copolymer-1 using statistical
55
measures, and the other used the second range approach.1
In construing the term "molecular weight," the district court
rejected the defendants' argument that the term was insolubly
ambiguous because it could refer to any number of methods of
measuring average molecular weight. 56 It then construed "molecular
57
weight" to mean Mp and held that the claims were not indefinite.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court's
construction of "molecular weight" de novo per the Cybor Corp.
standard. 55 The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court's
determination that the second set of claims that described the
59
molecular weight using the range approach was not indefinite.
However, the court reversed the district court's holding with respect
to the first set of claims that used statistical measures. 6 The Federal
Circuit reasoned that, beyond the incongruity between the two sets of
claims, the prosecution history of the patents-in-suit was also so
inconsistent as to make it difficult to conclude whether Mw, Mp, or
some other measure of average molecular weight was intended and
"render the ambiguity insoluble."''

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Teva Pharm., 723 F.3d at 1367.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1368.
Id. at 1369.
Id. at 1366, 1369.
Id. at 1369.
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In its petition for a writ of certiorari, Teva presented the
following question which closely matches the issue debated in
Lighting Ballast III:
Whether a district court's factual finding in support of its
construction of a patent claim term may be reviewed de novo, as the
Federal Circuit requires (and as the panel explicitly
did in this
62
case), or only for clear error, as Rule 52(a) requires.
Many of the same amici curiae who filed briefs in Lighting Ballast III
also submitted briefs. 63 Oral argument was heard on October 15,
2014. " Since certiorari was granted in Teva Pharmaceuticalsin March
2014, parties in several other cases have also petitioned for certiorari
on the same issue:
* On April 22, 2014, Gevo, Inc. submitted a petition for a writ
of certiorari challenging the Federal Circuit's decision in
Butamax(TM) Advanced Biofuels L.L.C. v. Gevo, Inc.'65 The
case was vacated and remanded back to the Federal Circuit
for reconsideration.

166

*

OnJune 20, 2014, Lighting Ballast also submitted a petition
for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. 167 This case
was scheduled for conference on September 29, 2014."6
* On August 18, 2014, Shire Development, LLC petitioned
for a writ of certiorari challenging the Federal Circuit's
decision in Shire Development, LLC v. Watson Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.'69 Certiorari was granted on January 26, 2015 and the
case was vacated and remanded to the Federal Circuit. 7 '
* On August 22, 2014, Takeda Pharmaceutical Company Ltd.
petitioned for a writ of certiorari challenging the Federal
Circuit's decision in Takeda Pharmaceutical Co. v. Zydus
162. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135
S. Ct. 831 (2015), 2014 WL 230926.
163. No. 13-854, SuP. CT. U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?
filename=/docketfiles/13-854.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2015).
164. Id.
165. 746 F.3d 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2014), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 1173 (2015); No. 13-1286,
Sup. CT. U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docketfiles/131286.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2015).
166. Gevo, Inc. v. Butamax Advanced Biofuels LLC, 135 S. Ct. 1173, 1173 (2015).
167. No 13-1536, SuP. CT. U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?
filename=/docketfiles/13-1536.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2015).
168. Id.
169. 746 F.3d 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2014), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 1174 (2015); No. 14-206,
Sup. CT. U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docketfiles/14206.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2015).
170. Shire Dev., LLCv. Watson Pharm., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1174, 1174 (2015).
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Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.'71 The petition was denied on
December 1, 2014.172
On September 23, 2014, Stryker Corp. submitted its
petition for a writ of certiorari challenging the Federal
173
Circuit's decision in Hill-Rom Services, Inc. v. Stryker Corp.

*

"

The petition was denied on December 1, 2014.171
On October 20, 2014, Apple, Inc. submitted its petition for
a writ of certiorari challenging the Federal Circuit's
decision in Ancora Technologies, Inc. v. Apple, Inc. 17' This
petition was denied onJanuary 12, 2015.176
On October 30, 2014, Braintree Laboratories, Inc.
submitted its petition for a writ of certiorari challenging the
Federal Circuit's decision in Braintree Laboratories, Inc. v.
Novel Laboratories, Inc. 7 7 The petition was denied on
December 8, 2014.178

"

The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the cases to
which it granted certiorari with instructions for the
Federal Circuit to reconsider in light of its decision in
decision Teva PharmaceuticalsUSA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc 7 9 on
January 26, 2015.80

171. 743 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 711 (2014); No. 14-217, Sup.
CT. U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docketfiles/14-217.htm
(last visited Apr. 20, 2015).
172. Takeda Pharm. Co. v. Zydus Pharm. USA, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 711, 711 (2014).
173. 755 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 719 (2014); No. 14-358, Sup.
Cr. U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docketfiles/14-358.htm
(last visited Apr. 20, 2015).
174. Stryker Corp. v. Hill-Rom Servs., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 719, 719 (2014).
175. 744 F.3d 732 (Fed. Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 957 (2015); No. 14-469,
Sup. CT. U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docketfiles/14469.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2015).
176. Apple, Inc. v. Ancora Techs., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 957, 957 (2015).
177. 749 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 764 (2014); No. 14-499, SuP.
Cr. U.S., http://www.supremecourtgov/search.aspx?filename=/docketfiles/14-499.htm
(last visited Apr. 20, 2015).
178. Braintree Labs., Inc. v. Novel Labs., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 764, 764 (2014).
179. 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015).
180. Shire Dev., LLC v. Watson Pham., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1174 (2015); Lighting
Ballast Control LLC v. Universal Lighting Techs., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1173 (2015); Gevo,
Inc. v. Butamax(TM) Advanced Biofuels L.L.C., 135 S. Ct. 1173 (2015).
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C. Laches as a Defense to PatentInfringement Claims
In A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Construction. Co., 8 ' the Federal
Circuit held that laches was a valid defense and compatible with
federal statutory law," 2 which states that "no recovery shall be had for
any infringement committed more than six years prior to the filing of
the complaint." 8" The Federal Circuit harmonized the doctrine of
laches with the statutory provision by arguing that the six-year
limitation on damages was not a statute of limitations in the sense of
barring an infringement suit. 18 4

Rather, it merely set a limit for

85
recovering damages up to six years prior to the filing of the complaint.
Recently in Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 8 6 the U.S. Supreme
Court reversed the Ninth Circuit holding that the doctrine of laches
could not provide a valid defense to a copyright infringement claim
that was brought within the statutorily allowed three-year period from
the date of infringement. 187 The opinion emphasized that the
Supreme Court has "never applied laches to bar in their entirety
claims for discrete wrongs occurring within a federally prescribed

limitations period.' ' 8

Rather, the Court stated that laches is a "gap-

filling, not legislation-overriding" measure that is appropriate when
there is no explicit statute of limitations.8 9 The Supreme Court also
noted the Patent Act's six-year limitation on damages and
acknowledged the co-existing trademark laches doctrine, but it stated
that its decision did not address laches in the patent context. 9 '
In light of Petrella, two cases have questioned the availability of
laches as a defense in patent case-SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag v.
First Quality Baby Products, LLC 9 1 and Reese v. Sprint Nextel Corp.'1 2 The
appellants in both cases argued that the Federal Circuit should
overrule Aukerman's laches holding in light of Petrella, while the
181. 960 F.2d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc).
182. Id. at 1028.
183. 35 U.S.C. § 286 (2012).
184. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1030.
185. Id.
186. 134 S. Ct. 1962 (2014).
187. Id. at 1974 (reversing the Ninth Circuit's ruling that affirmed the decision of
the district court, which dismissed the action on the basis of laches).
188. Id. at 1974-75.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1974 n.15 ("We have not had occasion to review the Federal
Circuit's position.").
191. 767 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014), vacated, No. 2013-1564, 2014 WL 7460970
(Fed. Cir. Dec. 30, 2014) (per curiam).
192. No. 2:13-cv-03811, 2014 WL 3724055 (C.D. Cal.July 24, 2014).
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appellees argued that Aukerman's laches holding remains valid and
controlling.193 On December 30, 2014, the Federal Circuit granted
an en banc rehearing in SCA Hygiene Products, vacated its prior
holding, and reinstated the appeal."04
The availability of laches in patent cases has been a key defense in
patent infringement actions."9 5 The defense of laches bars recovery
by the plaintiff of any damages prior to the filing of the suit. Set forth
in Aukerman, the doctrine of laches has essentially two elements: (1)
an unreasonable and unexcused "delay" in bringing suit against the
accused infringer; and (2) that "delay" resulted in "material
prejudice" to the accused infringer-which could be either
evidentiary or economic prejudice."9 6 Unavailability of laches as a
defense would be a significant setback to the arsenal of defense
attorneys in patent cases and shake up the dynamics of the playing field.
On August 2, 2010, SCA brought a patent infringement action
against First Quality in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Kentucky, more than six years after its initial
correspondence with First Quality regarding possible infringement.' 9
First Quality filed motions for summary judgment based on laches
and equitable estoppel defenses, which SCA opposed.'9 The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of First Quality on both
9
equitable estoppel and laches."'
On September 17, 2004, after the
Supreme Court had decided Petrella, the Federal Circuit affirmed the
summary judgment on laches but reversed on equitable estoppel. 0 0
On the issue of laches, the court reasoned that, due to the six-year
delay, the plaintiff carried the burden to rebut the presumption of
laches but failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding
the reasonability of its delay and the economic prejudice caused to
the defendant. 20 1 The SCA Hygiene Products panel refused to
entertain a merits reconsideration of Aukerman, arguing that
"[b]ecause Aukerman may only be overruled by the Supreme Court
193. SCA Hygiene Prods., 767 F.3d at 1344-45; Reese, 2014 WL 3724055, at *1.
194. SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, No. 20131564, 2014 WL 7460970, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 30, 2014).
195. See generally Jean F. Rydstrom, Annotation, Laches as Defense in Patent
Infringement Suits, 35 A.L.R. FED. 551 (1977).
196. A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Corp., 960 F.2d 1020, 1028
(Fed. Cir. 1992).
197. SCA Hygiene Prods., 767 F.3d at 1342.
198. Id. at 1343.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1351.
201. Id. at 1346-48.
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or an en banc panel of [the Federal Circuit], Aukerman remains
2 2
controlling precedent.""
On October 15, 2014, SCA filed a petition for rehearing the case
en banc of the initial decision in light of Petrella.2 3 In its brief, SCA
argues that Petrella cannot be reconciled with Aukerman and hence
the Federal Circuit should either overrule A.C. Aukerman or, in the
alternative, abolish the Aukerman presumption of laches on the
plaintiff.20

4

In support of its argument for overruling Aukerman's

laches, SCA argues that the judicially created doctrine of laches
cannot trump when Congress provides a limitations period and
Petrellaundermines all arguments in support of laches in Aukerman.2 °5
Further, SCA argues that there is no actual difference between
copyright law and patent law and, therefore, principles of equity must
serve both fields. 20 6 SCA also argues that, in the alternative, the
Federal Circuit should abolish the Aukerman presumption of laches
on the plaintiff because Petrella establishes that each infringing act
starts a new limitations period-a contradiction to Aukerman's
treatment of serial patent infringement as a unitary harm.20 7
In response, First Quality argues that Aukerman's laches holding
should not be overruled because 35 U.S.C. § 286 is not a statute of
limitations-it "only restricts the extent to which one can recover prefiling damages."20 8 In the absence of a statute of limitations, the
Supreme Court recognized the "gap-filling" role of laches in Petrella,
which is also corroborated by the legislative history and commentary
of 35 U.S.C. § 282 that enlists available defenses.20 9 First Quality
further points out that SCA should have raised the inapplicability of
laches defense at the district court level for preservation on appeal,
rather than arguing to overrule Aukerman after fully briefing and

202. Id. at 1345.
203. Combined Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc of PlaintiffsAppellants SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag and SCA Personal Care, Inc. at 2, SCA
Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, No. 2013-1564, 2014 WL
7460970 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 30, 2014).

204. Id.
205. Id. at 5-8.
206. Id. at 10-12.
207. Id. at 12-13.
208. Response of Defendants-Appellees to Combined Petition for Rehearing and
Rehearing En Banc at 1, SCA Hygine Prods. Aktiebolag, 2014 WL 7460970 (No.
2013-1564) (quoting Leinoffv. Louis Milona & Sons, Inc. 726 F.2d 734, 741 (Fed.
Cir. 1984)).

209. Id. at 3-9.
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arguing the appeal once already.210 Moreover, in countering SCA's
argument for abolishing the Aukerman presumptions of delay and
prejudice, First Quality asserts that SCA previously admitted that
"whether the presumption applies or not was irrelevant. '2 '1 Finally,
since the outcome of the case would not be altered even in the
absence of a "presumption" of laches due to the unreasonableness of
the delay and the economic prejudice suffered, First Quality argues
that the case does not present the occasion to review the
presumption of laches.212
Morris Reese filed a patent infringement action against Sprint and
four other defendants on May 29, 2013.21
The district court
disjoined the action into five cases and designated the case against
Sprint as the lead case.214 On March 17, 2014, each of the five
defendants filed a motion for summary judgment asserting laches as a
defense, which Reese opposed by arguing that there were genuine
issues of material fact concerning laches.1
The district court
granted summary judgment on all five cases and affirmed its decision
upon a motion for reconsideration based on Petrella 16
Reese filed a timely appeal to the Federal Circuit, requesting an en
banc reconsideration of the availability of Aukerman laches in light of
Petrella.217 In his petition, Reese argues that Petrella "swept away the
logical foundations of Aukerman's laches holding." 218 Reese agrees
with the arguments made in SCA's petition but points out that his
219
case is the better vehicle to overrule Aukerman's laches holding.
Reese contends that, unlike in SCA Hygiene Products, there is no
equitable estoppel issue in his case that could render the laches issue
moot.220
Overruling Aukerman's laches decision would conserve
judicial resources by mooting issues including the reasonableness of
Reese's delay in filing suit, the prejudice suffered by defendants, and
the possible abuse of discretion by the trial judge who ruled on the

210. Id.atl10-11.
211.
212.
213.
Nextel
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

Id. at 11.
Id. at 11-12.
Petition of Plaintiff-Appellant for Hearing En Banc at 6, Reese v. Sprint
Corp., No. 2015-1030 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 29, 2014).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 6-7.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id. at 8-9.
Id. at 10-11.
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summary judgment motion before the close of discovery. 221 Finally,
Reese argues that this rare simultaneous consideration of two en banc
petitions that present the same question gives the Federal Circuit
an
222
opportunity to clarify its standards for granting en banc review.
In response, two of the defendant-appellees, Verizon and AT&T
Mobility, respond that the Court should not reconsider Aukerman
because Petrelladoes not invalidate Aukerman but rather supports the
availability of Aukerman's laches. 223 According to the appellees,
Congress's decision not to enact a statute of limitations for patent
infringement claims reflects an implicit endorsement of the defense
of laches and hence the fundamental argument of Petrella-"in face
of a statute of limitations enacted by Congress, laches cannot be
invoked to bar legal relief'-does not apply to patent cases.224 Rather,
35 U.S.C. § 286 is a damages limitation for up to six years available to a
225
plaintiff who promptly files suit upon knowledge of infringement.
On the other hand, the appellees argue that the doctrine of laches
serves a different purpose than Aukerman because it prevents
retrospective relief when a plaintiff sleeps on his patent rights for an
extended period, thereby causing prejudice to the defendant by such
delay.226 Such a doctrine has been recognized in patent cases for over
a century.2 27 Finally, the appellees agree with Reese that, if the
Federal Circuit does decide to reconsider Aukerman's laches holding,
their case is a better vehicle than SCA Hygiene Products for all of the
reasons cited by Reese and because SCA Hygiene Products waived any
argument that Aukerman was incorrectly decided.2 28
The Federal Circuit briefly cited Aukemnan in June 2014, in Southern
Snow ManufacturingCo. v. SnoWizard Holdings, Inc.,229 where appellants
and cross-appellants appealed from the decision of the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, which found that
cross-appellant and defendant SnoWizard's laches defense was
meritless.2 0 Even though one of the plaintiffs in the case brought
221. Id.
222. Id. at ll.
223. Response to Petition for Hearing En Banc at 3-4, Reese, No. 2015-1030.
224. Id. at 5 (quoting Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962,
1974 (2014)).
225. Id. at 6.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 13-14.
229. 567 F. App'x 945 (Fed. Cir. 2014), ceit.
denied, 135 S. Ct. 1416 (2015), and cert.
denied, 135 S.Ct. 1439 (2015).
230. Id. at 957.
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claims after a thirteen-year delay, the Federal Circuit reasoned that
adjudication of a laches defense is a matter of discretion of the trial
judge and not a question for the jury and that the defendant had
waived the laches defense by failing to raise it in the final pre-trial
order.2 1' Therefore, the district court had not abused its discretion
by rejecting the defendant's laches defense. 2
Such a holding
implicitly affirms the Federal Circuit's belief in the doctrine of laches
as a valid defense even after the Supreme Court's decision in Petrella
in May 2014.
The Federal Circuit's decision on the availability of laches as a
defense in patent infringement actions will be observed with great
interest, irrespective of which vehicle it chooses to address the issueSCA Hygiene Products or Reese. Given that the Supreme Court
consciously avoided the issue of laches in patent cases in Petrella, it is
unlikely that the Federal Circuit will be swayed to change its
controlling precedent in Aukerman. If it does, however, the change
could have a significant impact on the strategy used by defense
attorneys in patent infringement cases brought after more than six
years since the notice of infringement.
D. Fee Shifting
In light of the 2014 Supreme Court decisions Highmark, Inc. v.
Alicare Health Management System, Inc. 233 and Octane Fitness, LLC v.
ICON Health & Fitness, Inc.,234 the Federal Circuit considered updated
fee-shifting provisions.
The judges applied the standards for
awarding attorney's fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285 and 15 U.S.C.
§ 111 7 (a). These cases highlight the expanding reach of the Octane
and Highmark holdings to willfulness (under 35 U.S.C. § 284) and
review of litigation stay orders.
On April 29, 2014, the Supreme Court simultaneously issued two
decisions regarding fee shifting: Highmark and Octane.23 5 Section 285
of Title 35 allows courts to award attorney's fees to prevailing parties
rok Furniture Manufacturing, Inc. v.
in "exceptional cases. "12361 In Brooks
DutailierInternational,Inc.,23 7 the Federal Circuit defined exceptional
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
Health

Id.
Id.
134 S.Ct. 1744 (2014).
134 S.Ct. 1749 (2014).
Highmark, 134 S.Ct. at 1748-49; Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1758.
35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012).
393 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005), abrogated by Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON
& Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014).
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cases as (1) where a party engaged in "material inappropriate
conduct"; or (2) where the litigation is both objectively baseless and
brought in subjective bad faith. 38 The Federal Circuit continued by
saying that there is a presumption of good faith for an assertion of
infringement on a properly issued patent, and litigants must present
"clear and convincing evidence" to assert otherwise.2 39
In Octane, the Supreme Court overturned Brooks Furniture's
"mechanical formulation."240
Octane involved elliptical exercise
machines that allowed users to adjust the stride lengths to personal
preferences.24 1 ICON lost its patent infringement suit against Octane
on summary judgment, and Octane moved for attorney's fees.242 The
District Court denied Octane attorney's fees and the Federal Circuit
affirmed. 243 The lower courts applied the standard from Brooks
Furniture,which the Supreme Court rejected as too rigid. 24" While the
Federal Circuit applied the first prong of the Brooks Furniturestandard
to situations of litigation misconduct for independently sanctionable
conduct, the Supreme Court said courts could award attorney's fees
in exceptional cases even if not independently sanctionable. 245 The
Supreme Court rejected the second prong of the Brooks Furniture
standard as an invalid importation of the Noerr-Pennington antitrust
doctrine.24 6 Also, the Brooks Furniture standard's rigidity renders it
superfluous because courts have long applied a common law
exception to the "American rule" when parties acted either in bad
faith or with willful disobedience. 4 7 The Court also rejected Brooks
Furniture's clear and convincing evidence standard in favor of the
lower preponderance of the evidence standard.2 48
Similarly, in Highmark, the Supreme Court said the newly
announced Octane standard should be used when awarding attorney's

238.
239.
240.
241.

Id. at 1381.
Id. at 1382.
Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1752-54.
Id. at 1754.

242. Id. at 1755.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 1755-56.
245. Id. at 1756-57.
246. Id. at 1757-58 ("In the Noerr-Penningtoncontext, defendants seek immunity

from ajudicial declaration that their filing of a lawsuit was actually unlawful .... ").
247. Id. at 1758; see also Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S.
240, 258-59 (1975) ("[A] court may assess attorneys' fees.., when the losing party
has 'acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.'").
248. Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1758.
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fees. 2"9 The Court also clarified the standard of review as an abuse-ofdiscretion standard for reviewing 35 USC § 285 decisions. 250
Accordingly, the Court vacated the Federal Circuit's decision and
remanded the case.251 In September 2014, the Federal Circuit
applied Octane in Homeland Housewares, LLC v. Sorensen Research &
Development Trust.25 2 Homeland Housewares arose after Sorensen, the
patentee, sent a cease-and-desist letter to Homeland Housewares, the
alleged infringer, regarding Sorensen's patent for thin-wall plastic
products.25 3
Homeland Housewares responded by seeking a
declaration of non-infringement, unenforceability, and invalidity of
the patent.

54

The district court ruled that Homeland Housewares

did not infringe because Sorensen failed to produce evidence of
infringement. 255 Ultimately, the court denied the invalidity and
unenforceability claims.256
Homeland Housewares moved for
attorney's fees under § 285, and the court partially granted the
motion due to clear and convincing evidence of Sorensen's
misconduct, involving repeated failures to produce evidence of
infringement. 25 7 Applying the Octane standard, the Federal Circuit
found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in partially
awarding attorney's fees for Sorensen's misconduct when it
considered the totality of the circumstances. 258 The Federal Circuit
259
affirmed the lower court's decision.

The Federal Circuit also applied Octane in Checkpoint Systems, Inc. v.
All-Tag Security S.A. 260
Checkpoint sued All-Tag for patent
26
infringement.
After finding for All-Tag, the district court awarded
All-Tag $6.6 million in attorney's fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285.262 The
Federal Circuit reversed, finding that All-Tag failed to prove that the
litigation was objectively baseless or brought in bad faith.2 6 The
249.

Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1748 (2014).

250. Id. at 1748-49.
251. Id. at 1749.
252. 581 F. App'x 877 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
253. Id. at 878-79.
254. Id. at 879.

255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 879-80.
258. Id. at 880-81; see Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct.
1749, 1756 (2014) (instructing district courts to look at the totality of the circumstances).
259. Homeland Housewares, 581 F. App'x at 882.
260. 572 F. App'x 988 (Fed. Cir. 2014).

261. Id. at 988.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 988-89.
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Supreme Court granted All-Tag's subsequent petition for certiorari
and remanded the case to the Federal Circuit to be reconsidered
consistent with the new Octane standard.2" The Federal Circuit
remanded the case to the district court in light of the Supreme
Court's guidance that district courts are best positioned to assess
whether a case is "exceptional" under § 285.265
Section 35(a) of the Lanham Trademark Act parallels § 285 of the
Patent Act. 266 The Third Circuit in FairWind Sailing,Inc. v. Dempste267
discerned the Octane decision to apply to trademark infringement
actions and the granting of attorney's fees.268 The court held that
attorney's fees may be awarded when (1) the merit of a position
taken by a party qualifies as an "unusual discrepancy" or (2) a party
litigated in an "unreasonable manner. '' 26' The court vacated the
attorney's fees award found under the old standard and remanded
the case to the district court to determine 2if
the case satisfies the
"exceptional" standard consistent with Octane.70
The Sixth Circuit also considered a case involving both 35 U.S.C.
§ 285 and 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). Premium Balloon Accessories, Inc. v.
Creative Balloons Manufacturing, Inc. 27 1 dealt with two companies that
made helium balloon accessories, such as heavy weights that prevent
such balloons from floating away.272
Following a trade dress
infringement suit in 1999, Creative entered into a settlement
agreement with Premium for use of the trade dress.273 In 2009,
Creative started making a "SuperStar" balloon weight that was similar
to Premium's "Heavy Weight" balloon weight.2 74 Premium filed suit
for trade dress infringement. 275 Creative responded by arguing that it
had acquired trade dress rights through the earlier agreement and by
asserting infringement of Creative's balloon-sealing patent.276 The

264. Id. at 989.
265. Id.
266. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2012) ("The court in exceptional cases may award
reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party."); 35 U.S.C. § 285 ("The court in
exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.").
267. 764 F.3d 303 (3d Cir. 2014).
268. Id.at 315.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. 573 F. App'x 547 (6th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1532 (2015).
272.

Id. at 548.

273.
274.
275.
276.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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court held Creative had a valid license to use Premium's trade
dress. 277 The court ruled Premium's design to be functional and
lacking distinctiveness and secondary meaning and found that
Premium had been selling its balloon-sealing device for close to a
decade before Creative's patent. 27 8 Applying the Octane standard for
"exceptional" cases, the court noted that Creative had not acted in
bad faith when it asserted the patent infringement claims or when it
had applied for the patent. 279 In light of Creative dropping the
patent infringement claims as soon as it learned of Premium's prior
commercial use, the district court erred in awarding attorney's fees
under § 285.280
The court rejected Creative's trade dress
infringement claims against Premium regarding the balloon-sealing
device. 281 Again applying the Octane standard, the court reversed the
award of attorney's fees under § 1117 (a) because Creative voluntarily
2 82
dropped the claims when it became aware of Premium's prior use.
On October 22, 2014, the Federal Circuit, in Halo Electronics, Jnc. v.
Pulse Electronics, Inc.,283 affirmed the district court's finding that, for
sales of surface mount electronic packages in the United States, Pulse
infringed Halo's patents on surface mounted electrical transformers
used on printed circuit boards.2 8 4 The court found inducement for
Pulse's sales outside the U.S. but imported into the U.S. by third
parties.28 5 It also affirmed the district court's finding that "Pulse's
'
infringement was not willful."286
Judge O'Malley's concurrence
suggested that the Federal Circuit update its standard for willfulness
87
in light of the Highmark and Octane opinions
As interpreted by Aro Manufacturing Co.
v. Convertible Top
Replacement Co., 8' 35 U.S.C. § 284 allows enhanced damages for
"willful or bad-faith infringement." '89 The standard for willfulness

277. Id. at 552.
278. Id. at 554-55, 558.
279. Id. at 559.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. 769 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014), reh'g en banc denied, 780 F.3d 1357 (Fed.
Cir. 2015).
284. Id. at 1374, 1383.
285. Id. at 1383.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 1386 (O'Malley, J., concurring).
288. 377 U.S. 476 (1964).
289. Id. at 508; see also 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012) (allowing punitive damages up to
three times the damage).
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under In re Seagate Technology, LLC" requires a patentee to show by
clear and convincing evidence that (1) an objectively high likelihood
of infringement existed and (2) the infringer knew this risk. 29 1 This
test and Brooks Furniture'stest for "exceptional" cases under 35 U.S.C.
§ 285 erroneously relied on a broad reading of ProfessionalReal Estate
Investors, Inc. v. Columbia PicturesIndustries, Inc.2 91 2 The concurrence in

Halo Electronics suggests applying a flexible test to willfulness
assessments, similar to the flexible standard applied to attorney's fees
following Octane.291 Judge O'Malley also noted that the evidentiary
standard should change from clear and convincing to preponderance
of the evidence.294
Similarly, the court should consider changing the standard of
review for willfulness from de novo to abuse of discretion.295 Judge
O'Malley concluded by asking the full court to determine ifjudges or
juries should handle willfulness assessments. 296
While such
assessments could require courts to weigh factual evidence, the mere
presence of such elements should not override Congress' designation
of courts to make such determinations.2 97 It remains open when the
full court will conduct an evaluation of the willfulness standard.
In VirtualAgility, Inc. v. Salesforce.com, Inc.," the Federal Circuit
considered whether to stay litigation pending a Covered Business
Methods (CBM) review. 299 The court applied a four-factor test under
section 18(b) (1) of the America Invents Act and reversed the district
court's denial of a stay of litigation."' Judge Newman's dissent
examined Highmark's abuse of discretion standard for a fee-shifting
analysis and applied it to review of litigation stays.30' Newman said
review of a litigation stay order should be done on an abuse of
discretion standard, not de novo, because the four-factor analysis is
3 2
fact intensive and not amenable to "useful generalization."

290.
291.
292.
293.

497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1371.
508 U.S. 49 (1993); Halo Elecs., 769 F.3d at 1384 (O'MalleyJ., concurring).
Halo Elecs., 769 F.3d at 1384-85 (O'Malley, J., concurring).

294. Id. at 1385.
295. Id. at 1385-86.
296. Id. at 1386.
297.
298.

Id.
759 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2014).

299.
300.
301.
302.

Id. at 1309.
Id.
at 1309, 1320.
Id. at 1322-23 (Newman,J., dissenting).
Id. at 1323.
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Further, Judge Newman commented that district courts remain
better positioned to balance party interests. 303
IV. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
A.

Induced PatentInfringement Under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)

This Section discusses recent and pending Supreme Court
decisions, as well as notable 2014 Federal Circuit opinions, regarding
induced patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b).
1.

The Supreme Court on § 271(b)
Though the high court recently opined on the standard for
induced infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) in 2011 in GlobalTech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 3" 4 it is already considering what some
believe to be a fundamental change in the landscape in assessing the
requisite intent for induced infringement. In Global-Tech Appliances,
the Supreme Court held that "induced infringement under § 271 (b)
requires knowledge that the induced acts constitute patent
infringement. "305 In so holding, the Court confirmed that § 271 (b)
also requires knowledge of the existence of the patent that is
infringed, premising its decision on its prior decision in Aro
Manufacturing Co. that the same knowledge is required for
contributory infringement under § 271 (c). 6
This year, the Supreme Court is considering additional issues
surrounding induced infringement including a new defense borne
out of the Federal Circuit's 2013 decision in Commil USA, LLC v.
Cisco Systems, Inc." 7 In Commil, the Federal Circuit vacated a jury's
verdict on induced infringement and remanded for a new trial,
relying in pertinent part on Global-Tech Appliances to hold that "the
jury was permitted to find induced infringement based on mere
negligence where knowledge is required."0 8 In so holding, the
Court found that the district court gave a legally erroneous
instruction because "the jury instruction allowed Cisco to be held
303. Id.
304. 131 S.Ct. 2060, 2068 (2011). The high court also pronounced that the
doctrine of willful blindness should apply in civil lawsuits for induced patent
infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b), but this aspect of the court's decision is
beyond the scope of this article. Id. at 2069.
305. Id. at 2068.
306. Id.
307. 720 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 704, and cert. granted in
part, 135 S. Ct. 752 (2014).
308. Id. at 1367.
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liable if 'Cisco knew or should have known that its actions would

induce direct infringement. '39
In Commil, the Federal Circuit also considered, and agreed with,
Cisco's argument that it was improperly precluded from presenting
evidence of its good-faith belief of invalidity to rebut allegations of
induced infringement.3 10 Acknowledging that "[i] t is axiomatic that
one cannot infringe an invalid patent," the Court held "that evidence
of an accused inducer's good-faith belief of invalidity may negate the
requisite intent for induced infringement. "311 The court explained,
however, "[t] his is, of course, not to say that such evidence precludes
a finding of induced infringement. Rather, it is evidence that should
be considered by the fact-finder in determining whether an accused
312
party knew 'that the induced acts constitute patent infringement.'
While the Federal Circuit agreed that Cisco could assert its goodfaith defense on remand, the court denied Cisco's challenge to the
lower court's grant of a partial new trial based on prejudicial remarks
by Cisco's counsel with respect to Commil's Jewish owners and
inventors. 13 In pertinent part, Cisco argued that granting a partial
new trial on induced infringement and damages, but not direct
infringement and validity, violated the Seventh Amendment.1 4 The
Federal Circuit rejected Cisco's argument, noting that "patent
infringement and invalidity are separate and distinct issues. ' 315 The
court acknowledged that the case was unique insofar as the jury
would be considering evidence of invalidity with respect to Cisco's
good-faith belief defense to induced infringement, but reasoned
that "the jury must merely decide whether Cisco possessed that
belief in good-faith.
The jury need not decide whether the
underlying position was meritorious." 316 Accordingly, the Federal
Circuit held that separate trials on invalidity and induced
infringement would not constitute an infringement of the Seventh
Amendment right to a fair trial. 7
In January 2014, Commil filed a petition for writ of certiorari,
asking the high court to certify the following questions:
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id.at 1368.
312. Id. at 1368-69.
313. Id. at 1370-71.
314. Id. at 1371.
315. Id. (quoting Pandrol USA, LP v. Airboss Ry. Prods., Inc., 320 F.3d 1354, 1365
(Fed. Cir. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
316. Id. at 1372.
317.

Id.
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1. Whether the Federal Circuit erred in holding that a defendant's
belief that a patent is invalid is a defense to induced infringement
under 35 U.S.C. § 271 (b).
2. Whether the Federal Circuit erred in holding that Global-Tech
Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011) required retrial
on the issue of intent under 35 U.S.C. § 271 (b) where the jury (1)
found the defendant had actual knowledge of the patent and (2)
was instructed that "[i]nducing third-party infringement cannot
occur unintentionally."318
In February 2014, Cisco cross-petitioned and presented the
following question:
"Whether, and in what circumstances, the
Seventh Amendment permits a court to order a partial retrial of
induced patent infringement without also retrying the related
question of patent invalidity." '19 Cisco's cross-petition was denied
without explanation on December 1, 2014.20 Commil's petition was
granted on December 5, 2014 limited to Question 1 presented by
the petition. 21
i. The Federal Circuit'sCommil USA, LLC v. Cisco Systems Decision
While Commil and Cisco's petitions were pending in 2014, the

Federal Circuit issued two decisions bearing directly on the extent to
which an accused infringer can rely on a good-faith belief of invalidity
to negate the requisite intent for induced infringement, as set forth
in Commil. First, though issued as an unpublished opinion, the
Federal Circuit in Bose Corp. v. SDI Technologies, Inc. 3 22 examined the
propriety of the district court's grant of summary judgment absolving
the defendant of indirect infringement liability based on an opinion
of counsel. 23 The Federal Circuit reversed, finding that the district
court "improperly depended on incomplete evidence of SDI's goodfaith belief of the asserted patent's invalidity and of SDI's reliance on
the opinion of counsel.3 2 4
The court based its decision on two primary grounds.

First, the

court reasoned that the grant of summary judgment "entirely absolved
SDI of indirect infringement liability" and that "[sIeveral points in
318. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i-ii,
Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc.,
135 S. Ct. 752 (2014) (No. 13-896), 2014 WL 281332 (alteration in original).
319. Conditional Cross-Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Cisco Sys. Inc. v.
Commil USA, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 704 (2014) (No. 13-1044), 2014 WL 825181.
320. Cisco Sys., 135 S. Ct. at 704.
321. Commil, 135 S.Ct. at 752.
322. 558 F. App'x 1012 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
323. Id. at 1022-23.
324. Id. at 1025.
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time deserve independent analysis to judge SDI's good-faith belief of
invalidity."3 25 In particular, the court found that "[w]hether SDI had
such a good-faith belief prior to receiving the opinion of counsel is a
triable issue for the jury to consider. Therefore the summary
judgment incorrectly absolves SDI of liability from December 10,
2008 until May 22, 2009, when SDI received the opinion of
counsel."126 Second, the court found a material dispute on the issue
of whether the defendant actually relied in good-faith on its opinion
of counsel, noting that "[a] party seeking to show lack of the requisite
intent to infringe, based on receipt of a competent counsel opinion
of noninfringement or of invalidity, must also show that it 'had
exercised reasonable and good-faith adherence to the analysis and
' 27 It reasoned that SDI's allegations of reliance were
advice therein."'1
disputed and that, even if uncontested, "summary judgment could
not lie without uncontested proof of the date upon which such good328
faith reliance began."
The Federal Circuit further opined on the Commil/ Cisco good-faith
belief of invalidity defense to inducement in VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco
Systems, Inc. 329

Specifically, the court reviewed the district court's

decision to exclude evidence offered by the defendant, Apple, at trial
that it had initiated reexaminations against the asserted patents and
that its requests resulted in initial rejections of the asserted claims by
the PTO.3 ' Apple had offered the rejections as evidence of its
reasonable belief of invalidity, to prove that it failed to meet the
requisite intent element for inducement.3
The district court had
excluded the evidence, finding it prejudicial and misleading
because the PTO's actions were non-final. 32 The Federal Circuit
affirmed the exclusion, noting that "this court's precedent has often
warned of the limited value of actions by the PTO when used for
such purposes." 333 The court further reasoned in VirnetX that it
need not decide whether [its] opinion in Commiljustifies reliance

on reexamination evidence to establish a good faith belief of
invalidity.
Instead, [it] conclude[d] that, regardless of the
325. Id. at 1022-23.
326. Id. at 1023.
327. Id. at 1024 (quoting Cent. Soya Co. v. Geo. A. Hormel & Co., 723 F.2d 1573,
1577 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
328. Id.
329. 767 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
330. Id. at 1324.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id.
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evidence's relevance to a fact at issue at trial, the district court
would still not have abused its discretion in finding that the
probative value was substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair
prejudice to the patentee, confusion with invalidity (on the merits),
or misleading the jury, thereby justifying exclusion under Federal
Rule of Evidence 403.334
In short, both Bose Corp. and VirnetX put some constraints on the goodfaith belief of invalidity defense to inducement set forth in Commil
ii.

OtherNotable 2014 FederalCircuitDecisions on Section 271(b)

Beyond Commil and its progeny, three additional induced
infringement decisions from the Federal Circuit in 2014 merit
discussion. First, in Microsoft Corp. v. DataTern, Inc., s3 the Federal
Circuit examined whether a patent-holder's suits against Microsoft's
and SAP's customers successfully initiated declaratory judgment
jurisdiction
for
Microsoft
and
SAP
regarding
induced
infringement.33 6 The court quoted its prior decision in Arris Group,
Inc. v. British Telecommunications PLC,3 7 to recognize that
where a patent holder accuses customers of direct infringement
based on the sale or use of a supplier's equipment, the supplier has
standing to commence a declaratory judgment action if. .. there is
a controversy between the patentee and the supplier as to the
supplier's liability for induced or contributory infringement based
338
on the alleged acts of direct infringement by its customers.
It also relied on Global-Tech Appliances, acknowledging that "[t]o
prove inducement of infringement, unlike direct infringement, the
patentee must show that the accused inducer took an affirmative act
to encourage infringement with the knowledge that the induced acts
3 9
constitute patent infringement."
With those principles in mind, DataTernheld that "the claim charts
used in the customer lawsuits support a finding of jurisdiction for
only some of the declaratory judgment challenges at issue. "340 In
particular, the court upheld declaratory judgment jurisdiction for
SAP's lawsuit, finding that
334. Id. at 1324-25.
335.
336.
337.
338.

755 F.3d 899 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
Id. at 904-05.
639 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
DataTern,755 F.3d at 903 (alteration in original) (quoting Arris Grp., 639 F.3d

at 1375) (internal quotation marks omitted).
339. Id. at 904 (citing Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060,
2068 (2014)).

340. Id. at 905.
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these claim charts cite to SAP-provided user guides and
documentation for each claim element.
In other words,
DataTern's claim charts show that SAP provides its customers with
the necessary components to infringe the '402 and '502 patents as
well as the instruction manuals for using the components in an
3 41
infringing manner.
The court split, however, on Microsoft's declaratory judgment
claims.
Specifically, it upheld Microsoft's declaratory judgment
jurisdiction with respect to the '502 patent, finding that "[t]he claim
charts cite to Microsoft-provided online documentation for each
limitation of the '502 patent's representative claims. Thus, these
claim charts can be read to allege that Microsoft is encouraging the
34 2
exact use which DataTern asserts amount to direct infringement."
Conversely, for Microsoft's '402 patent claim, the court found that
the claim charts "cite exclusively to third-party-not Microsoft
provided-documentation for several key claim limitations" and that
"[n] othing in the record suggests that Microsoft encouraged the acts
accused of direct infringement, and simply selling a product capable
of being used in an infringing manner is not sufficient to create a
substantial controversy regarding inducement.1 43 Thus, the court
concluded that "Microsoft failed to establish that a substantial
controversy existed regarding Microsoft's infringement of the '402
3 44
patent at the time the complaint was filed."
Another notable induced infringement decision from the Federal
Circuit, Halo Electronics, touched on the extraterritoriality of § 271 (a),
though the underlying finding of inducement was not specifically
appealed.34 The court affirmed the judgment that "Pulse did not
directly infringe the Halo patents by selling or offering to sell within
the United States those accused products that Pulse manufactured,
shipped, and delivered outside the United States," but it also affirmed
the judgment of "direct infringement with respect to products that
Pulse delivered in the United States and the judgment of inducement
with respect to products that Pulse delivered outside the United
States but were imported into the United States by others."346 These
holdings were based on the facts that

341.
342.
343.
344.
345.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 907.
Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 769 F.3d 1371, 1378-79 (Fed. Cir. 2014),

reh'gen banc denied, 780 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2015).

346. Id. at 1383.
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[s] ome of Pulse's products were delivered by Pulse to customers in
the United States, but the majority of them were delivered outside
the United States...
[to] contract manufacturers [who]
incorporated the electronic packages supplied by Pulse into end
products overseas,.., which were then sold and shipped to
consumers around the world.347
With regard to direct infringement, the court opined that
when substantial activities of a sales transaction, including the final
formation of a contract for sale encompassing all essential terms as
well as the delivery and performance under that sales contract,
occur entirely outside the United States, pricing and contracting
negotiations in the United States alone do not constitute or
transform those extraterritorial activities into a sale within the
United States for purposes of § 271 (a).38
In
rejecting
direct
infringement
liability
for
products
manufactured, shipped, and delivered abroad, the court also rejected
Halo's argument that the sales at issue occurred in the United States
because Halo suffered economic harm as a result. 349

In so holding,

the court noted that "Halo recovered damages for products that
Pulse delivered outside the United States but were ultimately
imported into the United States in finished end products based on a
theory of inducement.'"350

The final notable induced infringement decision from the Federal
Circuit in 2014, Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Systems, Inc.,351 addresses
induced infringement in the context of "standard essential patents"
("SEP"). 352 The court explained that "[b]ecause the standard requires
that devices utilize specific technology, compliant devices necessarily
infringe certain claims in patents that cover technology incorporated
into the standard." 353 Regarding the requisite intent, the court
recognized that "[i]nducement requires that the alleged infringer
'knowingly induced infringement and possessed specific intent to
encourage another's infringement.'

35 4

Appealing the finding of inducement infringement, D-Link
contended that "Ericsson did not present sufficient facts from which

347. Id.at 1375.
348. Id.at 1379.
349. Id.at 1380.
350. Id.
351. 773 F.3d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
352. Id. at 1209, 1219.
353. Id. at 1209.
354. Id. at 1219 (quoting DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1306 (Fed.
Cir. 2006)).

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:735

a jury'could conclude that it knew the induced acts constituted
infringement," arguing that "knowledge of the patents plus
advertising compliance with 802.11(n) is not enough evidence upon
which to base a finding of induced infringement."355 The Federal
Circuit found that substantial evidence supported the jury's decision,
including "that D-Link knew about the patents and knew that the
patents potentially were essential to the 802.11(n) standard-a
D-Link
standard with which D-Link intentionally complied." 56
presented evidence that it did not think its actions constituted
infringement, but the Federal Circuit declined to overturn the verdict,
3 57
stating that "[q] uestions of intent are quintessential jury questions."
2.

Induced Infringement at the ITC

On May 13 2014, the Federal Circuit granted the petitions for
rehearing en banc in Suprema, Inc. v. ITC.358 The court's original
2013 opinion reversed the ITC's finding that Suprema was liable for
inducing infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271 (b) when it imported
manufactured hardware into the U.S. where Mentalix combined the
hardware with its own software to make a product that infringed
Cross Match's U.S. patents. 3 9 The reversal was based on the
majority's view that the inducement theory of infringement could not
stand because it requires both additional steps to complete the
infringement as well as a particular mens rea. 36
The en banc panel will consider Cross Match's question: whether
the ITC has authority to find a section 337 violation of the Tariff Act
and to "issue an exclusion or cease and desist order-where it finds
that an importer actively induced infringement of a patented
invention using its imported articles but the direct infringement
occurred post-importation. "361
The Federal Circuit will also consider the ITC's questions:
(1) Did the panel contradict Supreme Court precedent in [MetroGoldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.362 ] and precedents of this

355. Id. at 1220.
356. Id. at 1222.
357. Id.
358. No. 2012-1770, 2014 WL 3036241 (Fed. Cir. May 13, 2014).
359. Suprema, Inc. v. ITC, 742 F.3d 1350, 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2013), reh'gen banc
granted, No. 2012-1170, 2014 WL 3036241 (Fed. Cir. May 13, 2014).

360. Id. at 1363.
361. Intervenor's Combined Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc at 1,
Suprema, Inc., 2014 WL 3036241 (No. 2012-1170).
362. 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
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Court when it held that infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) is
"untied to an article"?
(2) Did the panel contradict Supreme Court precedent in Grokster
and this Court's precedent in [Standard Oil Co. v. Nippon Shokubai
Kagaku Kogyo Co. 6'] when it held that there can be no liability for
induced infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) at the time a
product is imported because direct infringement does not occur
until a later time?
(3) When the panel determined the phrase "articles that...
infringe" in 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1) (B) (i) does not extend to
articles that infringe under 35 U.S.C. § 271 (b), did the panel err by
contradicting decades of precedent and by failing to give required
deference to the [ITC] in its interpretation of its own statute?
(4)Did the panel misinterpret the Commission's order as a "ban
[on the] importation of articles which may or may not later give
rise to direct infringement" when the order was issued to remedy
inducement of infringement and when the order permits U.S.
Customs and Border Protection to allow importation upon
certification that the articles are not covered by the order?3"
Rehearing en banc has yet to occur, but the Federal Circuit will
now be able to consider the Supreme Court's decision in Limelight
Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Technologies, Inc. 65 when convening for
Suprema. The high court in Akamai unanimously held, contrary to the
Federal Circuit, that a defendant cannot be held liable for inducing
infringement of a patent method claim when no single entity has
directly infringed the claim, and direct infringement is not established
366
unless all steps of the claim are performed by a single entity.
B.

35 U.S.C. § 112(b) Indefiniteness

Under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b), patent "specification [s] shall conclude
with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly
claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor
regards as the invention. " '67 Failure to meet this requirement,
commonly referred to as 112(b) indefiniteness, will make a patent
invalid. Before 2014, the Federal Circuit's test for whether a patent's
claims were definite was the "insolubly ambiguous test," first seen in
363. 754 F.2d 345 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
364. Combined Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc of Appellee
International Trade Commission at 2, Suprema, Inc., 2014 WL 3036241 (No. 12-1170)
(third and fifth alterations in original) (citations omitted).
365. 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014).
366. Id. at 2119.
367. 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012).
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Exxon Research & EngineeringCo. v. United States.3 68 This test required
only that claims be "amenable to construction" and that claims would
'
be found invalid only if they were "insolubly ambiguous."369
Datamize,
LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc.3 70 slightly modified this test, noting that
"[s]ome objective standard must be provided in order to allow the
public to determine the scope of the claimed invention,
which
allowed more patents to be found indefinite under the insolubly
ambiguous test than under Exxon's formulation.
There were four 2014 Federal Circuit cases that led up to the
Supreme Court's Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc. 372 decision,

which sidestepped the possible impact of the change in the "insolubly
ambiguous" test. 373 After Nautilus, three Federal Circuit cases later in

the year cited it for their indefiniteness decisions, but did not provide
much additional guidance.,74
In Takeda Pharmaceutical,Takeda sued Zydus on an acid reflux drug
patent that contained granules in its coating agent.

75

Under the

district court's claim construction, the size of Zydus' granules
infringed on Takeda's patent.3 76

On appeal, Zydus argued that

because the patent did not specify a technique for measuring the size
of granules and different measurement methods could produce
different results, it was impossible to know whether a product
infringed.3 77 The Federal Circuit disagreed, noting "[t]hat there is
more than one way of determining the average particle diameter of
a particular sample does not render that clear claim language
indefinite" especially because "there was no evidence in this case
368. 265 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2001), abrogated by Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig
Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014).
369. Id. at 1375.
370. 417 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2005), abrogated by Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig
Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014).
371. Id. at 1350.
372. 134 S.Ct. 2120 (2014).
373. Id. at 2124 (rejecting the Federal Circuit's test in favor of a standard finding a
"patent [claim] is invalid for indefiniteness if its claims.., fail to inform, with
reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention").
374. See DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1260 (Fed. Cir.
2014); Interval Licensing, LLC v. AOL, Inc., 766 F.3d 1364, 1370-74 (Fed. Cir. 2014);
Augme Techs., Inc. v. Yahoo! Inc., 755 F.3d 1326, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
375. Takeda Pharm. Co. v. Zydus Pharm. USA, Inc., 743 F.3d 1359, 1361-62 (Fed.
Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 711 (2014).
376. Id. at 1363 (explaining that the district court construed the language in the
patent to allow for a ten percent deviation from the stated granule size and required
each granule core to be measured separately even if the cores had fused).
377. Id. at 1366.
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that different measurement techniques in fact produced
significantly different results for the same sample."3 '8 The court
"reverse[d] the district court's claim construction ruling and
resulting finding of literal infringement, [and] affirm [ed] the court's
judgment of no invalidity ....
In Ancora Technologies, Ancora sued Apple on a patent for verifying
whether software is allowed to be on a computer. 3 8" The district court
construed "program" to mean an application program, excluding
operating systems. 38 ' Further, it held that "volatile memory" and
"non-volatile memory" were not indefinite terms even though
Ancora's patent described a hard drive as an example of "volatile
memory," which Apple contended was not capable of informing a
person of ordinary skill in the art of the bounds of the invention.8 2
The Federal Circuit reversed the district court's construction of
"program" based on the prosecution history. 3 In its indefiniteness
evaluation, the court noted that it could easily sidestep whatever the
outcome of Nautilus would be because the terms "volatile memory"
and "non-volatile memory" have "clear, settled, and objective"
meanings to a person "of ordinary skill in the art. 38 4

It further

concluded that any statements made to the contrary in the
prosecution history of Ancora's patent were explained by the ability
of a hard drive to function as both volatile and non-volatile memory
and that the language in the patent did not rise to an attempt to
85
redefine the term.
In Braintree Laboratories, Braintree, a pharmaceutical company, had
a patent on a colon-clearing drug and sued Novel, a generic drug
maker, for the composition of its abbreviated new drug application. 6
Based on its claim construction, the district court granted summary
judgment of infringement and rejected Novel's counterclaim of

378. Id. at 1367.
379. Id. at 1370.
380. Ancora Techs., Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 744 F.3d 732, 733 (Fed. Cir. 2014), cert.
denied, 135 S. Ct. 957 (2015).
381. Id. at 734.
382. Id. at 737-38.
383. See id. at 735-37 (providing a detailed account of why various statements in
the prosecution history are not "sufficient to displace" the ordinary meaning of

"program" with a narrower one).
384. Id. at 737.
385. Id. at 738-39.
386. Braintree Labs., Inc. v. Novel Labs., Inc., 749 F.3d 1349, 1352 (Fed. Cir.), cert.
denied, 135 S. Ct. 764 (2014).

778

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:735

invalidity after a bench trial. 387 The Federal Circuit upheld parts of
the district court's claim construction but reversed other parts,
remanding for further consideration. 88 In upholding the district
court's decision on indefiniteness, the court agreed with Braintree
that "one of skill in the art would understand what a 'copious'
amount of diarrhea is," even though there is no clear definition for
what "copious" means. 89
In In re Packard,39 ° Packard applied for a patent, which was rejected
due to failure to meet the written description and indefiniteness
requirements.3 9 ' The Patent Trial and Appeal Board affirmed the
rejections as to indefiniteness, and the Federal Circuit affirmed the
Board's decision. 92 In Packard's argument at the Federal Circuit, he
contended that the USPTO should have used the "insolubly
ambiguous" standard in evaluating his claims. 9 3 The court rejected
the argument, holding that the USPTO was within its rights to reject
an application for failure to meet 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) indefiniteness
requirements without regard for the insolubly ambiguous test.3 94 The
court found it unnecessary to reach application of the insolubly
ambiguous test because a patent application is reviewed in a different
procedural posture than an issued patent and "Packard had an
opportunity to bring clarity to his claim language.3195 A vote to grant
certiorari is pending, and the government's response was filed on
April 9, 2015.96
The concurrence by Judge Plager laid out the history of the
insolubly ambiguous standard and explained why it does not apply to
USPTO decisions. 97 Plager identified three options for ambiguous
terms: (1) make them presumptively valid, without concern for the
notice function of patents (the "insolubly ambiguous" standard); (2)
"[g] ive weight to the notice function of patents while still recognizing

387. Id. at 1353.
388. Id. at 1352.
389. Id. at 1360.
390. 751 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (per curium), appealfiledsub nom. Packard v.
Lee, No. 14-655 (U.S. Dec. 2, 2014).
391. Id. at 1310.
392. Id. at 1310-11.
393. Id. at 1311.
394. Id. (explaining that the application of the insolubly ambiguous test raised
broader issues than needed to resolve the case).
395. Id. at 1312, 1314.
396. No. 14-655, Sup. CT. U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?
filename=/docketfiles/14-655.htm (last visited Apr. 23, 2015).
397. See In rePackard,751 F.3d at 1315-23 (PlagerJ., concurring).
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the role of presumption of validity" (the "person of ordinary skill"
standard); or (3) "[g]ive full weight to the importance of the notice
function," putting the burden on the patent drafter to solve
ambiguities. 98 While Packard argued for the first option, Plager
determined that the Board did not flout the Federal Circuit's
standard when it applied the third option because the Board had a
unique role in its pre-issuance position."
Plager observed that the
USPTO is not bound by any existing Supreme Court or Federal
Circuit decisions on claim construction issues and is therefore
entitled by law to adopt a different standard."' Further, it is good
policy for the USPTO to have a higher standard than courts because
it will have a better chance to remove ambiguity from claim
construction disputes in lawsuits, lower the cost to society of new
products and ideas, increase the opportunity for design-arounds, and
avoid wasting judicial resources. 4" Finally, "the USPTO does not
have to deal with the presumption of validity," unlike courts, which
allows it to form its own claim interpretation.4 2
The Supreme Court decided Nautilus in June 2014, rejecting the
insolubly ambiguous test.4 3 Biosig had a patent for an exercise heartrate monitor held in both hands to improve accuracy. 404 The relevant
language of Claim 1 went to a live electrode and a common electrode
4
"mounted... in spaced relationship with each other.""
The district
court granted summary judgment for invalidity because "spaced
relationship" was indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112 paragraph 2 (now
35 U.S.C. § 112(b) under the AIA). 4 6 The Federal Circuit reversed
and remanded under the insolubly ambiguous test because the
claim would be indefinite only when it is "not amenable to
construction or insolubly ambiguous."' 40 7 The court noted that
because there are inherent limits to how close or far the electrodes

398. Id. at 1320-21.
399. Id. at 1321-22, 1325.
400. See id. at 1324 (noting that "no precedent... addressing patent claim
construction issues suggests" that the USPTO is prohibited from interpreting
applicable standards).
401. See id. at 1324-25 (listing the negative consequences of ambiguous
patent language).
402. Id.at 1325.
403. Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2129-30 (2014).
404.

Id. at 2125.

405. Id. at 2126 (alteration in original).
406. Id.at 2127.
407. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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can be from each other, the claims were capable of being construed
and, thus, were not indefinite." 8
The Supreme Court agreed with the parties (1) that the standard
for whether a claim would be ambiguous was to be measured against
a person "skilled in the relevant art;" (2) that claims must be "read in
light of the patent's specification and prosecution history;" and (3)
that the relevant timeframe for examining a person skilled in the
art's knowledge would be that of the time of filing. 4 9 The Court then
2 to require that a
established the new standard, reading "§ 112,
patent's claims, viewed in light of the specification and prosecution
history, inform those skilled in the art about the scope of the
Under this reading, the
invention with reasonable certainty. '410
Court rejected the insolubly ambiguous standard as too amorphous
to meet the statutory definiteness requirement, noting that the
current formulation "can breed lower court confusion."41 ' The Court
then vacated and remanded for the Federal Circuit to decide the case
under a more definite standard.41 2
It remains to be seen whether the Federal Circuit will create a test
that the Supreme Court will approve on remand, as most patents are
susceptible to some sort of ambiguity, and a test which sets out a
bright line rule will likely be hard to formulate.413 Two recent
§ 112(b) decisions in the Federal Circuit have followed Nautilus:
Augme Technologies, Inc. v. Yahoo! Inc.414 and Interval Licensing LLC v.
AOL, Inc.415 However, both opinions stayed relatively silent on how
Nautilus affected their decisions.4"'

408. Id.
409. Id. at 2128.
410. Id. at 2129.
411. Id. at 2130.
412. Id. at 2131.
413. But see Tun-Jen Chiang & Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction
Distinction in Patent Law, 123 YALE L.J. 530, 533-34 & n.2 (2013) (acknowledging that
many scholars believe a key issue in patent law centers on ambiguous patent
language, but arguing that the ambiguity stems from inconsistent claim construction
and interpretation in the judiciary).
414. 755 F.3d 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
415. 766 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
416. See id. at 1370-74 (citing Nautilus in reaching several conclusions without
providing significant explanation of its application); Augne Techs., 755 F.3d at 1340
(mentioning Nautilus only once and quickly finding the issue in the case
"unquestionably meets this standard").
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Augme Technologies was the first Federal Circuit case to apply
Nautilus."7
Augme sued Yahoo! on two patents, and Yahoo!
countersued on one.41 s After finding that Yahoo did not infringe
Augme's patent, the court affirmed the district court's finding that
claim 7 of Yahoo's '320 patent was not indefinite, which the court
upheld in part based on Nautilus. 9 The claim limitation at issue, in
Yahoo's digital content delivery patent, was "receiving, by an ingest
server, the unique identifier to the digital content. '420 Augme argued

that this limitation made the claim indefinite because the server
actually receives digital content rather than a unique identifier.42 '
The court observed that Augme's arguments were "based on...
written description or enablement," rather than indefiniteness and
reiterated that
[tjhe standard for indefiniteness is "whether those skilled in the
art would understand what is claimed when the claim is read in
light of the specification." It requires "that a patent's claims,
viewed in light of the specification and prosecution history,
inform those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention
422
with reasonable certainty."
The court then found that the issue was "clear on its face and
unquestionably meets this standard."423
In Interval Licensing,Interval sued AOL, Apple, Google, and Yahoo!

on patents that "describe a system that acquires data from a content
provider, schedules the display of the content data, generates images
'
from the content data, and then displays the images on a device."424
The system included a "screen saver embodiment" and a "wallpaper

embodiment. "425 The embodiments involved displaying content in a
user's peripheral vision "in an unobtrusive manner that does not
distract a user."42' 6 The district court found the patents invalid due to
indefiniteness "because the patents fail[ed] to provide an objective

standard by which to define the scope" of the invention, and the
question

of infringement

"depend[ed]

on

usage in

changing

417. This case was decided on June 20, 2014, just eighteen days after Nautilus was
decided. Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. at 2120; Augme Techs., 755 F.3d at 1326.
418. Augme Techs., 755 F.3d at 1329.
419. Id.
420. Id. at 1338, 1340 (internal quotation marks omitted).
421. Id. at 1338-39.
422. Id. at 1340 (citations omitted).
423. Id.
424. Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 766 F.3d 1364, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
425. Id. at 1367.
426. Id. at 1367-68.
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circumstances. 4 2 7 The Federal Circuit applied Nautilus in affirming

invalidity, noting that while terms of degree are not inherently
indefinite, the "unobtrusive manner" language that the patent relied
on was "purely subjective," so the specification was determinative.4 28
The court found that the specification was so "muddled" that it did
not rise to the level required to make a person of ordinary skill in the
art aware of the objective scope of the claims.429 The court affirmed
invalidity for the claims, which involved the "unobtrusive manner"
language, and remanded for a determination of infringement under
its new construction of Interval's other claims. 80 On December 18,
2014, the Federal Circuit denied rehearing en banc without
431
concurrence or dissent.
In DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P.,432 DDR Holdings sued
several entities for infringement of patents covering "methods of
generating a composite web page that combines certain visual
elements of a 'host' website with content of a third-party
merchant.

'43 3

The court found the claims patent-eligible, found one

patent invalid because of anticipation, and remanded for
recalculation of damages under the surviving patent.4 4
The
defendants argued that the claims were indefinite because creating a
composite web page to match the "look and feel and visually
perceptible elements" of the host website was "impermissibly
subjective and fail[ed] to notify the public of the bounds of the
claimed invention.

'4 5

In the court's indefiniteness evaluation of the

surviving patent, the court applied Nautilus, noting that "[t]he
inquiry 'trains on the understanding of a skilled artisan at the time of
the patent application.'

4 36

The court found that "'look and feel' had

an established, sufficiently objective meaning in the art, and that the

427. Id. at 1369.
428. Id. at 1370-71.
429. Id. at 1372, 1374.
430. Id. at 1377-78.
431. Hal Wegner, IntervalLicensing Reh g En Banc Denied: Preludeto 'Nautilus II", on
the Road to the Supreme Court [Correction], L.A. INTELL. PROP. L. AS'N (Dec. 18, 2014),
http://www.aipla.net/interval-licensing-rehg-en-banc-denied-prelude-t-nautilus-iion-the-road-to-the-supreme-court-correction.
432. 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
433. Id. at 1248, 1250.
434. Id. at 1259, 1263.
435. Id. at 1259 (internal quotation marks omitted).
436. Id. at 1260 (quoting Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120,
2130 (2014)).
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'399 patent used the term consistent with that meaning. 4

37

In fact,

the defendant conceded that it and its customers understood the
meaning of "look and feel," making the term sufficiently definitive to
inform a person skilled in the art about the scope of the patent's
43
claims with reasonable certainty.
C.

Claim Construction

1. Claim Language
Claim construction begins with the words of the claim.4" 9 However,
the claims "must be read in view of the specification, of which they
are a part. '440

"[D]ifferent claim terms are presumed to have

different meanings." 4 1 In affirming the district court's construction
of the term "embedded" in Augme Technologies, the Federal Circuit
noted that "[e]ach asserted claim recites that the first code module is
'embedded' or 'configured to be embedded' and that the second
code module is 'retrieve [d]' or 'download [ed][,]' . . . [which] creates

a presumption that 'embedded' means something different than
'retrieved' or 'downloaded.'" 2
"[T]he doctrine of claim
differentiation disfavors reading a limitation from a dependent claim
into an independent claim." 443 In VirnetX, the Federal Circuit
"affirm[ed] the district court's construction of the term 'domain
name' as 'a name corresponding to an IP address."'444 There, Apple
argued that the proper construction was "a hierarchical sequence of
words in decreasing order of specificity that corresponds to a
numerical IP address.

' 445

The court stated that "fundamental

principles of claim differentiation disfavor reading Apple's
hierarchical limitation into the independent claims. ' 446 Because
437. Id.
438. Id.at 1261.
439. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312-14 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc)
(stressing that since the patent must "define precisely what (the] invention is," courts
should look to the words of the patent first); Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc.,
90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (instructing courts to first look to the patent itself).
440. Phillips,415 F.3d at 1315 (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52
F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), affd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
441. Helmsderfer v. Bobrick Washroom Equip., Inc., 527 F.3d 1379, 1382 (Fed.
Cir. 2008).
442. Augme Techs., Inc. v. Yahoo! Inc., 755 F.3d 1326, 1333-34 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(second and third alterations in original) (citation omitted).
443. VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 767 F.3d 1308, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
444. Id. at 1317.
445. Id. at 1316 (internal quotation marks omitted).
446. Id. at 1317.
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dependent claims required hierarchical formatting, the court
determined that it "strongly suggest[ed] that the independent claims
contemplate [d] domain names both with
and without the hierarchical
447
argument.
Apple's
rejected
and
format"
In Hill-Rom Services, "[t]he district court construed the term
'datalink' to mean 'a cable connected to the bed that carries
data.' 448 At issue was whether the datalink needed to be wired or
whether it could be wireless." 9 The Federal Circuit reversed the
district court's construction, in part, noting that several dependent
claims explicitly required a wired datalink.4 5 ° In fact, "[t]he only
distinction between claim 1 and claim 2 is the limitation that the
'datalink'

is a wired

datalink. ' 45 '

The court stated that the

presumption that a limitation present in a dependent claim is not
found in the independent claim is "especially strong where the
limitation in dispute is the only meaningful difference between an
independent and dependent claim. "452
"[I] t is improper to read limitations from a preferred embodiment
described in the specification-even if it is the only embodimentinto the claims absent a clear indication in the intrinsic record that
the patentee intended the claims to be so limited."453

In EPOS

Technologies Ltd. v. Pegasus Technologies Ltd.,45" the Federal Circuit held
that the district court had erroneously construed several claim
terms.4 5 First, it had erroneously construed the term "drawing
implement" because it had "import[ed] the word 'conventional"'
from preferred embodiments into its construction of the term.
Although it is true that the specifications recite embodiments
including 'conventional' writing implements, there is no clear
indication in the intrinsic record suggesting that the claims are
limited to 'conventional' drawing implements. "456 Likewise, the
district court had erroneously imported limitations in its construction
457
of the terms "given time interval," and "marking implement."
447. Id. (emphasis in original).
448. Hill-Rom Servs., Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 755 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir.), cert.
denied, 135 S. Ct. 719 (2014).
449. Id.
450. Id. at 1374.
451. Id.
452. Id.
453. Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 913 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
454. 766 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
455. Id. at 1340.
456. Id. at 1343 (citation omitted).
457. Id. at 1344-45.
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"[A] claim construction that excludes a preferred embodiment...
is rarely, if ever[,] correct and would require highly persuasive
evidentiary support."4 5 In EPOS Technologies, the Federal Circuit held
that the district court improperly construed the term "temporary
attachment" because it read out the preferred embodiment and was
inconsistent with the claim language.459
Although "[s]teps in a method claim need not necessarily be
performed in the order they are written[,] ... if grammar, logic, the
specification, or the prosecution history require the steps to be
performed sequentially, then the claims are so limited."46 In Apple,
Inc. v. Motorola, Inc.,461 the Federal Circuit held that the plain
meaning of the claim terms and the specification supported that the
third step of a method claim could only be performed after steps one
and two were performed.4 62
In Takeda Pharmaceutical,the district court construed the claim
term "fine granules having an average particle diameter of 400 Pim or
less.., to mean fine granules up to and including the enteric coating
layer having an average particle diameter of 400 pm (±10%) or
less."46 The Federal Circuit reversed, finding that it was improper for
the district court to include the ten percent margin of error in the
construction because "there [was] no indication in the claim that 400
pm was intended to mean anything other than exactly 400 pm" and
there was no indication in the specification that the inventors
intended to deviate from the plain and ordinary meaning.4 64 The
court was not "persuaded that the mere presence of the word
'about"' at three points in the specification can justify a 10%
expansion of claim scope."465
2.

Specification

"A claim term should be given its ordinary meaning in the
pertinent context, unless the patentee has made clear its adoption of

458. Anchor Wall Sys., Inc. v. Rockwood Retaining Walls, Inc., 340 F.3d 1298, 1308
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).
459. EPOS Techs., 766 F.3d at 1346-47.
460. Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (internal
citations omitted).
461. 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
462. Id. at 1309-10.
463. Takeda Pharm. Co. v. Zydus Pharm. USA, Inc., 743 F.3d 1359, 1362 (Fed.
Cir.) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 711 (2014).
464. Id. at 1363-64.
465. Id. at 1365.
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a different definition or otherwise disclaimed that meaning."4 66 The
specification and prosecution history only compel departure from the
plain meaning in two instances: lexicography and disavowal.4 67 The
standards for finding lexicography and disavowal are exacting. "To
act as its own lexicographer, a patentee must clearly set forth a
definition of the disputed claim term other than its plain and
ordinary meaning" and must "clearly express an intent to redefine
the term. "4"8 Disavowal requires that "the specification makes clear
that the invention does not include a particular feature,"469 or is
clearly limited to a particular form of the invention.47 °
47 1
This exacting standard was met in X2Y Attenuators, LLC v. ITC.
There, in construing the term "electrode," the Federal Circuit noted
that "[t]he patents' statements that the presence of a common
conductive
pathway electrode
positioned
between
paired
electromagnetically opposite conductors is universal to all the
embodiments and is an essential element among all embodiments or
connotations of the invention constitute clear and unmistakable
disavowal of claim scope.1"472
The court reiterated its prior
determination that "labeling an embodiment or an element as
473
'essential' may rise to the level of disavowal."
In Azure Networks, the Federal Circuit looked to the specification to
clarify whether the patentee had acted as his own lexicographer in
defining the meaning of the term "MAC Address" or whether the
customary and ordinary meaning in the industry should prevail.474
The court stressed that for a term mean something other than its
well-established definition, the patentee must "clearly set forth a
definition of the disputed term" and " [t] he lexicography must appear
with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision sufficient to

466. Ancora Techs., Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 744 F.3d 732, 734 (Fed. Cir. 2014), cer.
denied, 135 S. Ct. 957 (2015).
467. Thomerv. Sony Computer Entr'tAm. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
468. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
469. SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337,
1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
470. Edwards Lifesciences LLC v. Cook Inc., 582 F.3d 1322, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(discussing claims involving "intraluminal grafts" as compared to other graft claims).
471. 757 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
472. Id. at 1362 (citing GE Lighting Solutions, LLC v. AgiLight, Inc., 750 F.3d
1304, 1308-09 (Fed. Cir. 2014)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
473. Id. (citing GE Lighting Solutions, 750 F.3d at 1309).
474. Azure Networks, LLC v. CSR PLC, 771 F.3d 1336, 1347-48 (Fed. Cir. 2014),
vacated, 83 U.S.L.W. 3683 (2015).
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narrow the definition of the claim term in the manner urged."475 The

court determined that the patentee did not re-coin a new term of art,
especially because "'MAC address' has a 'clear, settled, and objective'
meaning to a person of ordinary skill in the art."47 6 Likewise, in
Ancora Technologies, the court concluded that nothing in the
specification or claims "would lead one of ordinary skill in the art to
understand that the claims use 'program' in a sense narrower than its
ordinary meaning."

47

Conversely, the Federal Circuit concluded that the patentee acted
as his own lexicographer in Allergan, Inc. v. Apotex Inc.478 in construing
the term "treating hair lOSS." 4 79
The specification stated that
"'[t]reating hair loss' includes arresting hair loss or reversing hair
loss, or both, and promoting hair growth."48 ° At issue was whether
the word "and" required that treating hair loss must include
promoting hair growth and arresting hair loss or reversing hair loss.48"
In light of the definition in the specification, as well as various
examples in the specification, the Federal Circuit concluded that
treating hair loss "may include a method of promoting hair growth
'
without also arresting or reversing hair loss." 482
In Ferring B. V. v. Watson Laboratories, Inc.,4" 3 the Federal Circuit
construed the term "about," which was not defined explicitly or by
implication in the specification of the patent.48 4 The court agreed
with the district court and determined that "about" should be given
its plain and ordinary meaning of "approximately" and refused to
construe "about" to represent a particular numerical error rate. 85
In VirnetX the Federal Circuit reversed the district court's
construction of the term "secure communication link."486 The Court
found that when read in light of the entire specification, the term
required anonymity. 487 Further, "[t]he fact that anonymity is

475. Id. at 1349 (internal quotation marks omitted).
476. Id.
477. Ancora Techs., Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 744 F.3d 732, 735 (Fed. Cir. 2014), cert.
denied, 135 S. Ct. 957 (2015).
478. 754 F.3d 952 (Fed. Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 956 (2015).
479. Id. at 957.
480. Id.
481. Id.
482. Id. at 958.
483. 764 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
484. Id. at 1388-89.
485. Id. at 1389.
486. VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 767 F.3d 1308, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2014).

487. Id. at 1317.
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'repeatedly and consistently' used to characterize the invention
strongly suggests that it should be read as part of the claim.'488
In Interval Licensing, the Federal Circuit tackled the "facially
subjective" claim term "unobtrusive manner." 489 The patentee argued

in part that a narrow example from the specification using an "e.g."
phrase clarified the scope of the limitation.49 The Federal Circuit
declined to "cull out a single 'e.g.' phrase from a lengthy written
description to serve as the exclusive definition of a facially subjective
claim term."49 ' The court explained that it might be different if an
"i.e." phrase had been used instead: "Had the phrase been cast as a
definition instead of as an example-if the phrase had been
preceded by 'i.e.' instead of 'e.g.'-then it would help provide the
4 92
clarity that the specification lacks.
ProsecutionHistory
Similarly, statements made during the prosecution of a patent can
result in disavowal of claim scope. In Vederi, LLC v. Google, Inc.,4 93 the
Federal Circuit reversed the district court's claim construction of the
3.

claim term "substantially elevations."

'

"

The district court had

construed the term to exclude spherical or curved images.4 95
However, the Federal Circuit concluded that the district court had
not sufficiently considered the intrinsic record.496 The court rejected
Google's argument that the patentee had disclaimed such
embodiments based on statements made in the specification of the
patent.497 Google also argued that the patentee had disclaimed
spherical or curved images during prosecution when it responded to
a rejection over a prior art reference.49 8 The Federal Circuit
disagreed, stating that the amendment to replace the claim term
"non-aerial view" with the claim term "substantially elevations"

488. Id. at 1318 (citing Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp., 653 F.3d 1314, 1321-23

(Fed. Cir. 2011)).
489.
490.
491.
492.
493.
494.
495.
496.
497.
498.

Interval Licensing, LLC v. AOL, Inc., 766 F.3d 1364, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
Id.
Id.
Id.
744 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
Id. at 1380.
Id.
Id. at 1383.
Id. at 1383-84.
Id.
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showed "no clear and unambiguous disavowal of spherical or curved
images that would support the district court's construction. 4 99
Google sought rehearing en banc, which was denied.0 0
In its
petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court, Google identified
the question presented as
When an applicant for a patent amends a claim to overcome the
[USPTO's] earlier disallowance of the claim, should a court (i)
presume that the amendment narrowed the claim and strictly
construe the amended claim language against the applicant, as this
Court has held, or (ii) presume that the claim scope remained the
same and require that any narrowing be clear and unmistakable, as
the Federal Circuit has held?50 1
Essentially, Google argues that the Federal Circuit's holding and
requirement that for disavowal the amendment must be "clearly and
unmistakably" or "clearly and unambiguously" narrowing contradicts
the Supreme Court's decision in Hubbell v. United States,0 2 which
states that claim amendments made to overcome a rejection by the
USPTO are presumptively narrowing and "must be strictly construed
5 3
against the inventor and in favor of the public.""
On November 19,
2014, Acushnet Company, Dell, Inc., Kaspersky Lab, Inc., Limelight
Networks, Inc., Newegg Inc., QVC Inc., SAS Institute, Inc., eBay, Inc.,
and Xilinx, Inc. filed a brief as amici curiae in support of Google.5 °4
Statements made during prosecution of a related foreign patent
can also affect claim construction. Such was the case in Apple, Inc. v.
Motorola, Inc. Motorola had distinguished certain prior art in a
related Japanese patent in the Japanese Patent Office after the U.S.
patent issued.50 5
The Japanese application shared the same
specification as the U.S. specification as well as an identical claim
17.500 The Federal Circuit held that Motorola should be bound by
the statements it made in connection with the Japanese proceeding
because the two patents were related, shared the same familial

499. Id. at 1384.
500. Vederi, LLC v. Google, Inc., No. 2013-1057, slip op. at 2 (Fed. Cir. June 18,
2014) (per curiam), denying rehg to 744 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
501. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Google, Inc. v. Vederi, LLC, No. 14-448
(U.S. Oct. 16, 2014), 2014 WL 7507328.
502. 179 U.S. 77 (1900).
503. Id. at 82.
504. Brief of Acushenet Co. Dell Inc., Kaspersky Lab, Inc., Limelight Networks,
Inc., Newegg Inc., QVC, Inc., SAS Institute Inc., eBay Inc., and Xilinx, Inc. as Amici
Curiaein Support of Petitioner, Google, Inc., No. 14-448, 2014 WL 6563346.
505. Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
506. Id.

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:735

relationship, claimed priority to the same PCT application, had the
same specification, contained an identical claim 17, and were "made
in an official proceeding in which the patentee had every5 incentive
to
°7
exercise care in characterizing the scope of its invention."
In BraintreeLaboratories,Novel's noninfringement claims argue that
the patentee made statements in its "patent term extension request"
that limited the scope of the claim term "purgation."508 However, the
Federal Circuit determined that the statements were not a clear and
unmistakable disavowal-the "post-issuance statement of the patentee
does not modify the plain meaning of the word 'purgation. "509
In Golden Bridge Technology, Inc. v. Apple, Inc.,51 ° the patentee
submitted a stipulated construction of a claim term in documents
accompanying an information disclosure statement ("IDS"). 51' The
Federal Circuit stated that "an applicant's remarks submitted with an
[IDS] can be the basis for limiting claim scope."512 The court
concluded that the patentee should be bound by that representation
because it "see[s] no meaningful difference between limiting claim
scope based on an applicant's stipulations contained in IDS
documents and an applicant's remarks contained in the IDS itself."513
By contrast, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court's
construction of the term "bed condition message" in Hill-Rom Services,
and stated that "statements made during prosecution of a later,
unrelated patent cannot form the basis for judicial estoppel.514
4.

ExtrinsicEvidence
In Tempo Lighting, Inc. v. Tivoli, LLC,515 the Federal Circuit
reiterated that for purposes of claim construction, primary focus is
given to intrinsic evidence, such as the claim language, specification,
and prosecution history. 16 The court noted that while a dictionary

507. Id. (citing Microsoft Corp. v. Multi-Tech Sys., Inc., 357 F.3d 1340, 1350
(Fed. Cir. 2004)).
508. Braintree Labs., Inc. v. Novel Labs., Inc., 749 F.3d 1349, 1354 (Fed. Cir.), cert.
denied, 135 S. Ct. 764 (2014).

509. Id. at 1355.
510. 758 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2014).

511.

Id. at 1364-65.

512. Id. at 1366 (alteration in original) (quoting Uship Intellectual Props., LLC v.
United States, 714 F.3d 1311, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2013)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

513. Id.
514. Hill-Rom Servs., Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 755 F.3d 1367, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir.), cert.
denied, 135 S. Ct. 719 (2014).
515. 742 F.3d 973 (Fed. Cir. 2014).

516. Id. at 977.
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definition was "not irrelevant," it had "relatively little probative value
in view of the prevailing intrinsic evidence." 517

Therefore, the

examiner incorrectly "resort[ed] to extrinsic evidence that was
'
inconsistentwith the more reliable intrinsic evidence."5 18
5.

Construction of Means-Plus-FunctionClaims
The Federal Circuit Examined "means-plus-function" claims in
Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc. Construing "means-plus-function" claim
terms involves two steps.51 9 First, the court "must determine if the
claim limitation is drafted in means-plus-function format.""' The
court will "construe the claim limitation to decide if it connotes
'sufficiently definite structure' to a person of ordinary skill in the art,
which requires [the court] to consider the specification (among
other evidence)."521 If the court concludes that the claim limitation is
in means-plus-function format, the court moves to the second step,
which requires it to "specifically review the specification for
'corresponding structure."522 "[W] hen a claim limitation lacks the
term 'means,' it creates a rebuttable presumption that [35 U.S.C.
§] 112, 6 does not apply," and the term should not be construed as
a means-plus-function element. 23
"This presumption may be
overcome if the claim fails to recite 'sufficiently definite structure' or
merely recites a 'function without reciting sufficient structure for
performing that function.'

5 24

However, the Federal Circuit has

characterized the presumption as "'strong' and 'not readily
overcome' and, as such, ha[s] 'seldom' held that a limitation without
5 25
recitation of 'means' is a means-plus-function limitation."
In Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., the Federal Circuit was faced with
determining whether the term "heuristic" was a means-plus-function
claim limitation.5 26 The court held that the district court had

517. Id.
518. Id. at 977-98 (citing Bell Ad. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Commc'ns Grp.,
Inc., 262 F.3d 1258, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
519. See Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
520. Id.
521. Id.
522. Id.
523. Id. at 1297.
524. Id. (quoting Linear Tech. Corp. v. Impala Linear Corp., 379 F.3d 1311, 1319
(Fed. Cir. 2004)).
525. Id. (citing Inventio AG v. ThyssenKrupp Elevator Arns. Corp., 649 F.3d 1350,
1356 (Fed. Cir. 2011)); Lighting World, Inc. v. Birchwood Lighting, Inc., 382 F.3d
1354, 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
526. Apple, Inc., 757 F.3d at 1294-96.
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misconstrued the term as a means-plus-function limitation and
"misapplied our precedent by requiring the claim limitations of
the
'949 patent themselves to disclose 'a step-by-step algorithm as
required by Aristocrat Technologies [Austrailia Pty v. InternationalGame
Technology].'

527

Although the court declined to determine whether

the term "'heuristic,' by itself, connote[d] sufficient structure to
maintain the presumption against means-plus-function claiming," it
concluded that in this case the "claims do not nakedly recite
heuristics without further description in the remaining claim
language and specification. 528 In fact, the court found that "the
claim language and specification disclose the heuristics' operation
within the context of the invention, including the inputs, outputs,
'529
and how certain outputs are achieved.
In Robert Bosch, LLC v. Snap-On Inc., 530 the court noted the

presumption that treatment under 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 6
applies "when a claim uses the word 'means' as a noun in the claim:
a 'means' for doing something."5"' The court further stated that the
presumption is not triggered by a claim's use of the expression "by
means of' and determined that the district court erred when it held
that the term "program recognition device" was a means-plusfunction term based on the phrase "by means of' in the claim.532
Regardless, even without the presumption, the court determined that
the terms "program recognition device" and "program loading device"
both invoked treatment under 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 6.
Similarly, in EnOcean GmbH v. Face International Corp.,53 4 the court
determined that the term "receiver" did not invoke treatment under
35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 6 because it "presumptively connotes
sufficiently definite structure to those of skill in the art" and "because
EnOcean has provided extensive evidence demonstrating that the
term 'receiver' conveys known structure to the skilled person. 535
527. Id. at 1298. The Aristocrat line of cases "hold that, if a patentee has invoked
computer-implemented means-plus-function claiming, the corresponding structure in the
specification for the computer implemented function must be an algorithm unless a
general purpose computer is sufficient for performing the function." Id. (citing
Aristocrat Techs. Austl. Pty v. Int'l Game Tech., 521 F.3d 1328, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
528. Id. at 1301.
529. Id.
530. 769 F.3d 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
531. Id. at 1098-99.
532. Id.
533. Id. at 1098-1101.
534. 742 F.3d 955 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
535. Id. at 959-60.

2014 PATENT LAW DECISIONS

2015]

793

D. PatentEligible Subject Matter under Section 101
36
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank InternationaP
continued the Supreme
Court's Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories,Inc. 537 and
Bilski v. Kappos 538 rulings on 35 U.S.C. § 101 patent-eligibility of
claims.539 Alice Corporation was the assignee of patents that disclosed
how to manage financial risk.5 4 The claims relate to "facilitate [ing]
the exchange of financial obligations between two parties by using a
computer system as a third-party intermediary." 541 The district court
found all of the claims ineligible because they were merely the
implementation of an abstract idea, even though all of the claims
involved a computer. 542 The Federal Circuit affirmed the district
court's judgment with respect to the method and media claims with
seven judges, but it only achieved a five-member plurality in affirming
the system claims, with some judges wanting to find the system claims
patent-eligible because they involved computer hardware that is
54
"specifically programmed to solve a complex problem.""
The Supreme Court affirmed the Federal Circuit, based mainly on
the ineligibility of abstract ideas implicit in the exception to 35 U.S.C.
§ 101, as laid out in the framework established by Mayo.544 The first
question is whether the claims were directed to a law of nature,
natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea. 545 In answering, the Court
considered both the individual elements and the elements "as an
ordered combination. "546
Second, was there an "inventive
concept"?547 An inventive concept is "an element or combination of
elements that is 'sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice
amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible
concept] itself."' 545
In applying step one of this framework, the

536.
537.
538.
539.
540.

134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
132 S.Ct. 1289 (2012).
561 U.S. 593 (2010).
Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2354-57.
Id. at 2352.

541.

Id.

542. Id. at 2353.
543. Id. (quoting CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269, 1307 (Fed. Cir.
2013) (en banc) (plurality opinion), affd, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
544. Id. at 2354-57 (examining and applying the 35 U.S.C. § 101 exception under
the Mayo analysis).
545. Id. at 2355 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v, Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S.
Ct. 1289, 1296-97 (2012)).
546. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
547. Id. (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294) (internal quotation marks omitted).
548. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1294).
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Supreme Court found that the claims are "drawn to the abstract idea
of intermediated settlement" and "a fundamental economic
'
practice."549
In step two, the Court likewise found that the claims
failed to disclose an "inventive concept" sufficient to transform the
abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention because it "merely
require [d] generic computer implementation." 5 1
Merely
introducing a computer into the claims did not alter the analysis, just
like Mayo's prohibition in stating an abstract idea and adding "apply
it. ' The Court distinguished computer-based claims like those seen
in Diamond v. Diehr,552 noting that the claims there "were patent
eligible because they improved an existing technological process, not
because they were implemented on a computer." 553 In contrast, the
claims in Alice Corp. did not "improve the functioning of the
554

computer itself.

Although the decision did not push the envelope too far, it was
used to invalidate all software patents in the Federal Circuit until
December 2014 when the Federal Circuit decided DDR Holdings.
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Alice Corp., the Federal
Circuit heard and also reheard several cases on appeal under Section
101.15

The Federal Circuit considered

and reconsidered

the

Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC556 case numerous times. Ultramercial
sued Hulu, YouTube, and WildTangent, alleging infringement of
U.S. Patent No. 7,346,545. 557
The district court granted
WildTangent's motion to dismiss for failure to state a patent-eligible
claim, while Hulu and YouTube were dismissed for other reasons not
at issue. 558 The Federal Circuit initially reversed the decision,- 9

549. Id. at 2355-56 (quoting Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010)).
550. Id. at 2357.
551. Id. at 2358 (citing Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294).
552. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
553. Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2358. The rubber curing claims in Diehr involved a
process using a "thermocouple," an invention that had not previously been used in
the industry. Id.
554. Id. at 2359.
555. See, e.g., Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC (Ultramercial111), 772 F.3d 709 (Fed.
Cir. 2014); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Planet
Bingo, LLC v. VKGS LLC, 576 F. App'x 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
556. (Ultramercial I11), 772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
557. Id. at 712.
558. Id. at 712-13.
559. Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC (Ultramercial 1), 657 F.3d 1323, 1324 (Fed.
Cir. 2011), vacated, 132 S.Ct. 2431 (2012).
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which was vacated by the Supreme Court in light of Mayo."6 On
remand, however, the Federal Circuit reversed again, and
WildTangent again petitioned for certiorari by the Supreme Court.56 1
While the petition was pending, the Supreme Court issued its
decision in Alice Cop.562 Thereafter, the Court granted the petition,
vacated the Federal Circuit's decision, and remanded the case for
further consideration in light of Alice Corp.5
Applying the Supreme Court's two-step analysis from Alice Corp.,
the Federal Circuit had to "determine whether the claims at issue
[were] directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts" and then
determine whether the claims are "sufficient to ensure that the
patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon
the [ineligible concept] itself."5 The Federal Circuit concluded that
the eleven steps listed in the claim, together, describe only the
abstract idea of showing an advertisement before delivering free
content and, therefore, failed the first step in the analysis. 6 5 The
claims similarly failed the second step-"the limitations of the '545
claims do not transform the abstract idea that they recite into patenteligible subject matter because the claims simply instruct the
practitioner to implement the abstract idea with routine,
'
conventional activity."566
The court further found that "[n]one of
these eleven individual steps, viewed 'both individually and as an
ordered combination,' transform the nature of the claim into patenteligible subject matter.5 - 67 Moreover, the Federal Circuit also looked
at the "machine-or-transformation" test when analyzing the second
step. 5' Applying that test, the Federal Circuit held that "It]he claims

560. Wild Tangent, Inc. v. Ultramercial, LLC (WildTangent 1), 132 S. Ct. 2431,
2431 (2012).
561. Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC (Ultramercial I), 722 F.3d 1335, 1337 (Fed.
Cir. 2013), vacated, 134 S. Ct. 2870 (2014).
562. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014) (decidedJune 19, 2014).
563. WildTangent, Inc. v. Ultramercial, LLC (WildTangent I), 134 S. Ct. 2870,
2870 (2014).
564. Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC (Ultramerciall11), 772 F.3d 709, 714 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (second alteration in original) (quoting Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2355)

(internal quotation marks omitted).
565. Id. at 714-15. The patent claims here include "eleven steps for displaying an
advertisement in exchange for access to copyrighted media." Id. at 714.

566. Id. at 715.
567.

Id. (quoting Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2355).

568. Id. at 716. The Supreme Court held in Bilski that the machine-ortransformation test is not the sole test governing Section 101 analyses. See Bilski v.
Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 604 (2010). However, the Federal Circuit stated the machine-
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of the '545 patent. .:. are not tied to any particular novel machine or
apparatus, only a general purpose computer," and that it did not
transform any article to a different state or thing.50 ' Thus, the claims
570
failed to satisfy either prong of the machine-or-transformation test.

The Federal Circuit again found no patentable subject matter in
Digitech Image Technologies, LLC v. Electronicsfor Imaging, Inc.57 The
court specifically addressed whether claims in U.S. Patent No.
6,128,415 are "directed to a device profile and a method for creating
57 2
a device profile within a digital image processing system."
However, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's conclusion
that the claims were invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because the device
profile claims do not "require any physical embodiment, much less a
non-transitory one"; rather, the device profile is merely "a collection
of intangible color and spatial information. 5 7' The method claims
were found invalid because while the claimed process employs
mathematical algorithms to manipulate existing information to
generate additional information, they lacked any additional
limitations.5 74 The court did not need to decide whether tying the
method to an image processor was patent-eligible subject matter.575
The Federal Circuit also failed to find eligible patent subject matter
in Planet Bingo, LLC v. VKGS LLC.576 The claims in U.S. Patent Nos.
6,398,646 and 6,656,045 were directed to managing a bingo game
while allowing a player to repeatedly play the same set of numbers in
multiple sessions.57 7 The court found the claims to be directed to the
abstract idea of solving a tampering problem and minimizing other
security risks during bingo ticket purchases; thus, the court
determined that they were not patentable under 35 U.S.C. §

101.

57

Beyond reasoning that the claims do not require anything that would
make the invention impossible to carry out manually, the Federal
Circuit applied Alice Corp. and found that the claims recite a generic
computer implementation of an abstract idea and that there is no
or-transformation test "can provide a 'useful clue' in the second step of the Alice Corp.
framework." UltramercialIlf,772 F.3d at 716.
569. Ultramercial11, 772 F.3d at 716.
570. Id. at 716-17.
571.

758 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2014).

572. Id. at 1347.
573. Id. at 1348, 1350.
574.

Id. at 1351.

575. Id.
576. 576 F. App'x 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
577. Id. at 1006-07.
578.

Id. at 1008.
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"'inventive concept' sufficient to 'transform' the claimed subject
matter into patent-eligible [subject matter] .""
In buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc.,5s° the Federal Circuit
overwhelmingly found the claims invalid under Alice Corp.58' "Given
the new Supreme Court authority in this delicate area, and the
simplicity of the present case under that authority.. . [t]he claims in
this case do not push or even test the boundaries of the Supreme
Court precedents under [35 U.S.C. §] 101. "582
The computer
functionality in the claims, relating to "a computer receiv[ing] a
request for a guarantee and transmit[ting] an offer of guarantee in
return," was found to be generic.5
Thus, similar to Alice Corp., the
use of computers here added no inventive concept, making the
claims invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101.584
In I/P Engine, Inc. v. AOL, Inc.,585 the majority did not address
invalidity, but Judge Mayer filed a concurring opinion based on Alice
Corp. and the Supreme Court's view in Parker v. Flook55 6 that "subject
matter eligibility analysis must precede the obviousness inquiry," and
he urged a "robust application" of 35 U.S.C. § 101.587
I/P Engine's claimed invention, which uses content data to
organize a user's query results by relevance, fails to make the subject
matter requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 101 because it does not "improve
the functioning of the computer itself or effect an improvement in
any other technology or technical field."58 "The asserted claims
simply describe the well-known and widely-applied concept" of
58 9
combining content and collaborative data on a generic computer.
Moreover, the scope would include almost all types of online

579. Id. at 1009.
580. 765 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Although Randall R. Rader was a member of
the panel, he did not participate in the decision following his resignation on june 30,
2014. Id. at 1351 n.*.
581. Id. at 1354-55.
582. Id.
583. Id. at 1355.
584. Id. (noting that the computers in Alice Corp. "receiving and sending
information over networks connecting the intermediary to the other institutions
involved" was not sufficient to overcome 35 U.S.C. § 101).
585. 576 F. App'x 982 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (per curiam).
586. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
587. I/PEngine,576 F. App'x at 983, 987; id. at 992, 995-96 (Mayer, J., concurring).
588. Id. at 994-95 (quoting Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2359
(2014)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
589. Id. at 995.
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advertising.590 Such marginal technological disclosure is entirely
outweighed by such pervasive reach.5 91
DDR Holdings involves patents with systems and methods of
generating a composite web page that combines visual elements of a
host website with the content of a third-party merchant.5 92 This
enables a website to display a third-party merchant's products but
retain the visitor traffic because the user will not have left the host
site.595 Judge Chen, writing for the Federal Circuit, found that the
'572 patent was invalid because it was anticipated under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(a), found no anticipation of the '399 patent, and found that
the patent was patent-eligible subject matter under the Supreme
Court's Mayo test, affirmed in Alice Corp.594 The court remanded to
determine damages for infringement of the '399 patent.595
In
examining the patents for patentable subject matter the court first
noted that the claims were not directed to an abstract idea.596 In
particular, the claims did not "recite a mathematical algorithm" or a
597
"fundamental economic or longstanding commercial practice.
The business challenge that the claims are directed to is retaining
website visitors, a challenge particular to the Internet, with the
solution "necessarily rooted in computer technology in order to
overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer
'
networks."598
Because the claims were not direct to an abstract idea,
the court did not need to reach step two of the test (which asks
whether the claim recites additional elements to overcome the
judicial exception).
Judge Mayer's dissent argued that this was
merely a "store within a store" concept, like a warehouse that
contains a kiosk."0 However, the majority distinguished DDR's
patent from this concept because the nature of the Internet poses
different challenges than the real world:
that practice did not have to account for the ephemeral nature of
an Internet 'location' or the near-instantaneous transport between
these locations made possible by standard Internet communication
590.
591.
592.
593.
594.
595.
596.
597.
598.

Id.
Id.
DDR
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.at

Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, 773 F.3d 1245, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
1248-49.
1248, 1254-55, 1257-59.
1262-63.
1255-57.
1256-57.
1257.

599. Id. at 1255-58.
600. Id. at 1264-65 (MayerJ., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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protocols .... It is this challenge of retaining control over the
attention of the customer in the context of the Internet that the
'399 patent's claims address.60 1
More importantly, the Federal Circuit held that the patent at bar
was distinguishable from the other software patents that have
recently been invalidated under 35 U.S.C. § 101, most notably
distinguishable from its closest analogue, Ultramercial III. 6 2
UltramercialIII claimed "use of the Internet" broadly and generically
with insignificant added activity over an abstract business practice,
but here, the patent manipulated Internet interactions to "override []
the routine and conventional sequence of events ordinarily triggered
by the click of a hyperlink."603
E. Secret PriorArt-35 U.S.C. § 102 (g)
In Solvay S.A. v. Honeywell InternationalInc.,6 "4 the district court held
one of the patent's claims was invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (2).6°
The patent at issue claimed an improvement to a method of making a
hydrofluorocarbon ("HFC") known as HFC-245fa.6 °6 The secret prior
art involved work done by engineers in Russia at the Russian
Scientific Center for Applied Chemistry ("RSCAC"), which was later
reduced to practice in the United States by Honeywell's personnel
before the priority date of October 23, 1995.607 In 1994, Honeywell

and RSCAC entered into an agreement whereby RSCAC "conducted
process development studies for the commercial production of HFC245fa." °8 RSCAC then sent Honeywell a report, which Honeywell
personnel used in the United States to run the same process prior to
the October priority date.6 0
Honeywell initially argued that its engineers were inventors under
§ 102(g) (2) because they reduced the invention to practice in the
United States.6 10 In a first round of summary judgment motions, the
district court granted summary judgment of invalidity under
§ 102(g) (2) because "the Honeywell engineers were other inventors
who made the invention in this country without abandoning,
601.
602.
603.
604.
605.
606.
607.
608.
609.
610.

Id. at 1258 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id.
742 F.3d 998 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
Id. at 999.
Id. at 1001.
Id. at 999, 1001.
Id. at 1001.
Id.
Id.

800
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suppressing, or concealing it."611 On appeal, the Federal Circuit
reversed, stating that "Honeywell personnel could not qualify as
,another inventor' because they 'did not conceive the invention of
the '817 patent, but derived it from others,' specifically, the RSCAC
engineers who 'first conceived the invention in Russia.'

' 612

On

remand, Honeywell argued that the Russian engineers made the
invention in the United States by sending the instructions, which
were used to reduce the invention to practice, to Honeywell
personnel.613 The parties thus disputed "whether (1) the Honeywell
reduction to practice should be attributed to the Russian inventors
and (2) whether the Russian inventors had disclosed the invention
rather than abandoning, suppressing, or concealing it. '614
The district court held that the RSCAC engineers were the legal
equivalent of inventors who made the invention in the United
States.6" 5 However, the jury determined that the asserted claim was
invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (2) because it was disclosed in a 1994
Russian patent application and had not been abandoned, suppressed,
or concealed.6 16 On appeal, Solvay challenged the jury's finding that
the invention had not been suppressed and the district court's ruling
that the RSCAC engineers had made the invention in the United
States.617 The jury's finding of non-suppression was based upon a
process disclosed in a Russian patent application.618 Solvay "argue [d]
that the application did not satisfy § 102(g) (2) because the
application did not disclose the full scope of the claims if they were
properly construed."61 The Federal Circuit found that Solvay waived
the issue because it "failed to object to the court's construction or
jury instruction with respect to the term 'isolating,"' but despite the
waiver, the Federal Circuit determined that the district court did not
err in its construction.6 2 °
Solvay also challenged the district court's finding that the RSCAC
engineers had made the invention in the United States based upon
the doctrine of inurement. 621 Solvay argued that there was no
611.
612.
613.
614.
615.
616.
617.
618.
619.
620.
621.

Id. at 1002.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1003.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1004-06.
Id. at 1006.
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inurement because the RSCAC engineers "did not expressly ask the
Honeywell researchers to perform the inventive process."62 2

The

Federal Circuit rejected this argument and affirmed the district court,
stating that "our case law does not support Solvay's contention that
an inventor must make an express directive or request to benefit
from a third party's reduction to practice. Rather, inurement exists if
6 23
the inventor authorizes another to reduce his invention to practice.
The court found that "the research agreement ...

confirm [ed] that

the RSCAC authorized Honeywell to practice its invention in the
United States and contemplated that [it] would do SO.624
F. Nonobviousness
2014 witnessed several important Federal Circuit decisions
regarding the law of nonobviousness as applied to the
pharmaceutical industry.
In Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Teva
PharmaceuticalsUSA, Inc. (BMS I),625 the patent-in-suit was directed in
part to a nucleoside analog composed of a carbocylic ring and a
guanine base, which forms an antiviral compound known as
entecavir, a drug used for the treatment of hepatitis B.626 Teva filed
an abbreviated new drug application ("ANDA") for a generic version
of entecavir, "alleging that its generic products would not infringe
the '244 patent. 6 27 Bristol-Myers Squibb ("BMS") subsequently sued
Teva for infringing the '244 patent with the ANDA filing.62 8 Teva
argued that the '244 patent was invalid for obviousness, based upon a
structurally similar prior art compound that predated the priority
date of the '244 patent by six years.629
The case was decided at the district court through a bench trial,
and the court found that the prior art compound was instrumental to
the development of antiviral drugs. ° It further determined that "a
skilled artisan would have been motivated to [alter the
compound] ... with a reasonable expectation of success of creating a
compound with beneficial antiviral properties."' 6'
Despite some
622. Id.
623. Id. at 1006-08.
624. Id. at 1006.
625. 752 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir.), reh'gen banc denied, 769 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014),
and appealfiled, No. 14-886 (U.S.Jan. 22, 2015).
626. Id. at 969.
627. Id. at 970.
628. Id.
629. Id. at 970-71.
630. Id. at 972.
631. Id.
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evidence of objective indicia of nonobviousness, the court found that
Teva proved by clear and convincing evidence that the relevant claim
of the patent-in-suit was invalid as obvious.632
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's
holding.63 3 In order to establish obviousness "in cases involving new
chemical compounds, the accused infringer must identify some
reason that would have led a chemist to modify a known [or lead]
compound."6 34

The Federal Circuit determined that the record

showed that a skilled artisan would have selected the prior art
compound as a lead compound due to the general interest at the
time of invention in carbocyclic analogs for their potential antiviral
effects.

635

Moreover, beyond generalities, the particular prior art

compound was already being considered and used as a lead
compound by medicinal chemists.6 36 The court discounted evidence
presented by BMS that the prior art compound was discovered to be
toxic not long after the priority date of the patent-in-suit.3 7 The
court further explained that the subsequent steps of deciding
whether to modify the carbocyclic ring or guanine base, which bond
to modify, and how to modify that bond "equate to a small, finite
number of changes" which a skilled artisan would have undertaken in
6 38
order to achieve a compound with improved antiviral activity.
Upon deferring to the district court's findings on objective indicia of
nonobviousness, the court affirmed that the '244 patent claim was
invalid for obviousness.639
BMS then petitioned the Federal Circuit for panel rehearing and
rehearing en banc, but both petitions were denied."4° However,
Judge Newman, who was joined by Judge Lourie and Judge Reyna,
dissented and identified four reasons why BMS I should have been
632. Id.
633. Id. at 979.
634. Id. at 973.
635. Id. at 973-74.
636. Id. at 974.
637. Id. ("[A]t the time of entecavir's invention, the Price reference showed that
2[#]-CDG was generally understood to be safe and nontoxic, and other researchers

were already using it as a lead compound. As the district court points out, in
'October 1990, 2[#]-CDG was not yet known to have high toxicity,' and BMS's
expert, Dr. Schneller, agreed that researchers at the time treated 2[#]-CDG as a
'promising compound."').
638. Id. at 975-76.
639. Id. at 976-79.
640. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. (BMS I1), 769 F.3d 1339,
1340 (Fed. Cir.), reh'gen banc denied, 769 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014), and appealfiled,

No. 14-886 (U.S.Jan. 22, 2015).
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reheard.6 4 First, BMS Iunnecessarily restricted the comparative data,
data that could be submitted to show unexpected properties, to
information that was available at the time of the invention." The
decision contradicted precedent by ignoring evidence that the prior
art compound 2#-CDG was "highly toxic and concededly... useless
in treating hepatitis B." 64 Second, BMS I misapplied the "'secondary
considerations' of nonobviousness" by filtering out information that
was discovered post-filing in contravention to "the characteristics of
medicinal and biological products."' Third, the court erred when it
stated that "unexpected results do not per se defeat, or prevent, the
finding that a modification to a lead compound will yield expected,
beneficial properties" as "an unexpected result or property is the
touchstone of nonobviousness."645 Finally, the court's reductive
analysis in holding that "a 'mere difference in degree' is 'insufficient'
to render a compound patentable" was inappropriate and inaccurate
where "the court held that a new and effective non-toxic treatment
for hepatitis B is merely a difference in degree from a highly toxic
and useless treatment for hepatitis B."646
Judge Taranto also dissented from the majority's decision denying
the petition for rehearing and was joined by Judges Lourie and
Reyna.64 7 He, like Judge Newman, warned that the panel opinion
could stand for the proposition that "any evaluation of prior art must
focus exclusively on what was known about the prior art's
properties.., at the time of the... invention" and stated that he
would have granted rehearing in order to resolve the questions raised
by such a departure from patent law precedent.64 BMS appealed the
denial of rehearing with a petition for a writ of certiorari on due on
January 20, 2015.1'
In In re Teles AG Infonnationstechnologien,650 certain claims of Teles'
No. 6,954,453 patent were rejected during an ex parte reexamination

641. Id. at 1347-51 (Newman,J., dissenting).
642. Id. at 1347-49.
643. Id. at 1349.
644. Id. at 1349-50.
645. Id. at 1350.
646. Id. at 1351.
647. Id. at 1352 (TarantoJ., dissenting).
648. Id. at 1356, 1359.
649. No. 14-886, S. CT. U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?
filename=/docketfiles/14-886.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2014).
650. 747 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Sigram Schindler
Beteiligungsgesellschaft MBH v. Lee, 135 S.Ct. 759 (2014).
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as invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 103.651 The Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences ("the Board") affirmed.6 52 Teles then brought suit in
the U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia, challenging the
Board's decision pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 145.653 "The district court
dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding
that, after the 1999 amendments, § 145 proceedings could not be
maintained by patent owners. "654 Teles appealed the dismissal, but
6 55
did not appeal the Board's decision.
The Federal Circuit recognized that it had jurisdiction to review
the district court's dismissal but that it had to determine whether it
also had jurisdiction to review the Board's decision.6 6 It found that it
had jurisdiction and stated that "[o]nce the district court held that it
lacked jurisdiction, it should have transferred the case pursuant to
[28 U.S.C.] § 1631. "1657 Thus, the Federal Circuit reviewed the case as
though it had been properly transferred.6 58 Ultimately, the Federal
Circuit affirmed both the district court and the Board's decisions.6 59
Teles then filed a Petition for Certiorari to the Supreme Court,
describing the question presented as
Does the US Constitution, in legal decisions based on 35 USC

§§ 101/102/103/112,
0

require instantly avoiding the inevitable legal errors in
construing incomplete and vague classical
claim
constructions-especially
for "emerging technology
claim(ed invention)s, ET CIs"-by construing for them the
complete/concise refined claim constructions of the
Supreme Court's
KSR/Bilski/Mayo/Myriad/Biosig/Alice
Corp. line of unanimous precedents framework,
or does the US Constitution for such decisions
* entide any public institution to refrain, for ET CIs, for a
time it feels feasible, from proceeding as these Supreme

651. Id. at 1359.
652. Id.
653. Id.; Teles AG v. Kappos, 846 F. Supp. 2d 102, 103-05, 112 (D.D.C. 2012), affd
in part and rev'd in part sub nom. In re Teles AG Informationstechnologien, 747 F.3d
1357 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Sigram Schindler Beteligungsgesellschaft MBH
v. Lee, 135 S. Ct. 759 (2014).
654. In re Teles, 747 F.3d at 1360.
655. Id.
656. Id.
657. Id. at 1361.
658. Id.
659. See id. at 1366, 1368-69 (affirming the district court's finding of lack ofjurisdiction,
while affirming the Board's decisions as to claim of construction and obviousness).
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Court precedents require-or meeting its requirements
just by some lip-service-and in the meantime to construe
incomplete classical claim constructions, notwithstanding
their implied legal errors?6 °
Teles' petition was denied on December 8, 2014.661 In a rare move,
the Supreme Court directed petitioner's counsel to "to show cause,
within 40 days, why he should not be sanctioned for his conduct as a
member of the Bar of this Court in connection with the petition [for
a
writ
of certiorari
in]
No.
14-424,
Sigram Schindler
662
Lee.
v.
MBH
Beteiligungsgesellschafl
CONCLUSION
The 2014 Federal Circuit Court consisted of a bench that was half
rookies: six judges had been on the bench less than 4 years, three of
which had been on the bench for only one year.663 The large number
of newly appointed judges made it difficult to predict how the
Federal Circuit would rule on intellectual property issues. Indeed,
many of the highlighted cases included vigorous dissents.
Table 1 sets forth the current composition of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. There are eleven active
service judges, six senior circuit Judges, and one vacancy (left by
former Chief Judge Randall R. Rader on June 30, 2014). Senior
Circuit Judges continue to serve on the court while handling fewer
cases than an active service judge.
TABLE 1: BiographicalDirectory of FederalJudges6 64
Title
Chief

Judge
Circuit

Judge
Circuit
Judge

Judge
Sharon
Prost
Pauline
Newman
Alan David
Lourie

Active
2001present
1984present
1990present

Chief
Senior
2014present

Appointed By
G.W. Bush

-

Reagan

-

G.H.W. Bush

660. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Sigram Schindler Beteiligungsgesellschaft
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